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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO A CUMULATIVE 
DISSERTATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The benefit of family planning is nowadays considered self-evident. It enables 
parents to appropriately time their personal relationship, self-development and 
career goals, as well as to ensure that they have the necessary resources to 
welcome a child into their family and provide him or her with the best con-
ditions for his or her care and development. Undoubtedly, unexpected parent-
hood may become very burdensome for the whole family, both financially and 
emotionally. It could be even more difficult for the parents to accept that their 
child, even if awaited with eager anticipation, is born severely disabled. Parents 
may feel that the enormous financial burden and frustration overshadows the 
otherwise happy and joyous event of becoming a parent.  
In their choices regarding family planning, parents are in many ways 
dependent on the health-care services and the information they receive from the 
health-care provider.  
The health-care provider can perform the necessary procedures to prevent 
the pregnancy (e.g. advise and offer contraception methods, perform sterili-
sation, etc.) or terminate the pregnancy. Also, the health-care provider can 
perform prenatal testing before gestation or during the pregnancy to give the 
parents information regarding the (potential) condition of the future child’s 
health. Expectations regarding the accuracy of such information have increased 
with the scientific and medical advances of recent times. With the necessary 
information at hand, parents can make a decision as to the continuation or 
otherwise of pregnancy.  
Medical error or misdiagnosis on the part of the health-care provider in the 
aforementioned procedures may result in unwanted pregnancy or the birth of a 
disabled child. However, it is clear that the health-care provider cannot be liable 
for every unsuccessful medical attempt to prevent the pregnancy or the birth of 
a disabled child.  
Nevertheless, even in the case of negligent acts by health-care providers, the 
obligation to compensate for the damages due to unwanted pregnancy or the 
birth of a disabled child has made courts across the world face uncomfortable 
decisions over ethical dilemmas.  
The unwanted pregnancy and birth of an unwanted child give rise to several 
claims of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage against the health-care provider 
that have been recognised in the case law of several countries.1 The parents’ 
                                                                          
1  With regard to case law in European countries, see e.g. the comparative report by B. A. 
Koch with reference to the case law regarding the cases of prenatal damages in B. Winiger et 
al. Digest of European Tort Law, Volume 2: Essential Cases on Damages. Berlin & Boston: 
Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG 2011, at pp. 875‒903, from p. 900 (about wrongful 
9 
claim of damages in the cases of unwanted pregnancy is also known as a 
wrongful conception claim. The parents’ claim of damages in the case of birth 
of an unwanted disabled child due to the health-care provider’s misdiagnosis is 
known as a wrongful birth claim. In case of the birth of an unwanted disabled 
child, a wrongful life claim is also recognised, where the child issues a claim 
against the health-care provider alleging the existence of damages through 
having been born disabled for reason of negligence by the health-care provider 
in failing to diagnose or warn about the disability or risk of disability.2 In this 
dissertation, the cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life 
are also referred to as cases of prenatal damages. 
In Estonia, the specific regulation concerning the health-care provider’s 
liability on the basis of contract for provision of health-care services entered 
into force on July 1st 2002 with the enforcement of the Law of Obligations Act 
(LOA).3 Before this date, claims against health-care providers were resolved 
under the Civil Code of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic under the 
general grounds of obligations arising from the infliction of damage.4 
This dissertation concerns the health-care provider’s civil liability in cases 
of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life particularly under the 
LOA health-care provider’s obligation to compensate for damages on the basis 
of contractual and delictual liability.  
In this dissertation, the person accountable for the damage is mainly 
referred to as a health-care provider. According to LOA § 758 (1), the health-
care provider is a person in whose professional activities provides health-care 
service to a patient.  
The current compendium is based on the author’s four publications: 
 
• ‘The Possibility of Compensation for Damages in Cases of Wrongful 
Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. An Estonian Perspective’.5 
The authors of the article are Dina Sõritsa and Janno Lahe. Dina Sõritsa 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conception claims), at pp. 905‒935, from p. 932 (about wrongful birth claims), at pp. 
937‒960, from p. 958 (about wrongful life claims). –  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110248494 
2  Different authors give different meanings to the terms wrongful conception, wrongful 
birth and wrongful life. For example, the wrongful conception cases (also known as wrongful 
pregnancy cases) has been regarded as a subtype of wrongful birth cases. Additionally, See 
B. C. Steininger. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Basic Questions. – Journal of European 
Tort Law, Vol. 1/2, 2010, pp. 125‒126; DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/JETL.2010.125. I. Giesen. 
Of wrongful birth, wrongful life, comparative law and the politics of tort law systems. – 
Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 72, 2009, p. 259. 
3  Law of Obligations Act. State Gazette (in Estonian Riigi Teataja) I 2001, 81, 487. 
Estonian legal acts are available also in English: www.riigiteataja.ee  
4  P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus III. Komm vlj (Law of Obligations Act III. Commented 
Edition). Juura 2009, p. 293. Civil Code of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. – ESSR 
Supreme Council Gazette (in Estonian ENSV Ülemnõukogu Teataja) 1964, 25, 115. 
5  European Journal of Health Law, Vol. 21/2 (2014), pp. 141‒160. –  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718093-12341311 
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worked through the source materials for the article and composed the main 
part of the text. 
• ‘The Health-care Provider’s Civil Liability in the Cases of Wrongful Life. 
An Estonian Perspective’.6 
• ‘Damages Subject to Compensation in Cases of Wrongful Birth: A Solution 
to Suit Estonia’.7  
• ‘The Obligation of the Health-care Provider to Compensate for Damages in 
Case of Wrongful Conception: a Model to Suit Estonian Law’.8 The authors 
of the article are Dina Sõritsa and Janno Lahe. Dina Sõritsa worked through 
the source materials for the article and composed the main part of the text. 
 
The above articles analyse, whether and what kind of damages should be com-
pensable in cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life. The 
author has analysed the grounds and the possibility of health-care provider’s 
liability in these cases under contract law and under the law of delicts.  
The article ‘The Possibility of Compensation for Damages in Cases of 
Wrongful Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. An Estonian 
Perspective’ explains the Estonian legal framework of the contractual and 
delictual basis for compensation for the damages and presents the preliminary 
argumentation regarding the health-care provider’s liability in the named three 
cases. The other three articles delve into the specific arguments regarding each 
case and focus on the analysis of the recoverable damage and the limits to the 
compensation.  
                                                                          
6  Juridica International, Vol. 23, 2015, pp. 43‒51. –  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2015.23.05 
7  Juridica International, Vol. 24, 2016, pp. 105‒115. –  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2016.24.11  
8  Journal of Medical Law and Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2016, pp. 95‒111. –  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7590/221354016X14690151940745  
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2. POSING AND DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
2.1. Posing the Research Problem 
Termination of pregnancy in Estonia is legal. According to Termination of 
Pregnancy and Sterilisation Act (TPSA)9 § 6 (1), the pregnancy may be 
terminated if it has lasted less than 12 weeks. The same article also enacts the 
special cases when the law allows for the termination of a pregnancy which has 
lasted for more than 12 but less than 22 weeks. One of the special cases to 
justify late abortion is if there is a possibility that the unborn child has a severe 
mental or physical impairment to its health (TPSA § 6 (2) subsection 2). There-
fore, the information obtained from the health-care provider regarding the 
pregnancy and the state of health of the foetus is essential to make an informed 
decision as to whether to terminate or continue the pregnancy. 
The case law in the cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and 
wrongful life is still completely missing in Estonia. This could be explained by 
the country’s small population, as well as the high controversy and emotionality 
of these cases, paired with the parents’ unwillingness to undertake the tiresome 
and expensive proceedings in court.10 However, the lack of case law in Estonia 
does not confirm the absence of facts that could in principle give rise to the 
claims under the rubrics of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful 
life. For example, according to data on neonatal morbidity collected from 
maternity hospitals in Estonia, in the year 2015 there were 266.4 cases of sick 
newborn, including 51.2 cases of congenital malformations, deformations and 
chromosomal abnormalities per 1000 live births.11  
The health-care provider’s liability in these cases is particularly contro-
versial, which has been repeatedly pointed out by lawyers and case law all over 
                                                                          
9  Termination of Pregnancy and Sterilisation Act. State Gazette I 1998, 107, 1766. 
10  Also, the absence of case law does not exclude the possibility of parties settling the 
dispute out of court. According to Health Services Organisation Act (HSOA) § 502 (1), the 
expert committee on quality of health services is competent to assess the quality of health 
services provided to patients and to make proposals arising from the assessment to the 
Health Board, the Estonian Health Insurance Fund and the health care providers. Health 
Services Organisation Act (HSOA). State Gazette I 2001, 50, 284. Thus, the patients can rely 
on the opinion of the expert committee on quality of health services and the existence of 
medical error or misdiagnosis can be determined without the need to issue a claim in court. 
The existence of a reliable opinion provides the necessary information for negotiation with 
the health-care provider regarding the compensation for the damages.  
11  In 2010, the numbers of sick newborn and congenital malformations and abnormalities 
per 1000 live births were slightly lower (respectively 239.7 sick newborn and 39.4 cases of 
congenital abnormalities), according to the data from the database of Health Statistics and 
Health Research by the Estonian National Institute of Health Development. Available at: 
http://pxweb.tai.ee/esf/pxweb2008/Database/Haigestumus/01Esmashaigestumus/01Esmashai
gestumus.asp (27.03.2017). 
12 
the world.12 Some countries have chosen an extreme solution and have 
prohibited by law the issuing of claims in the cases of wrongful birth and 
wrongful life.13 This is another indication of the relevance of this topic.  
It can be alleged that in the situations of unwanted pregnancy or the birth of 
a disabled child the causal link chain originates from the parents’ decisions 
regarding reproduction and thus transferring the adverse consequences onto the 
health-care provider is unjust. However, the core of the parents’ claim in the 
cases of wrongful conception and wrongful birth (or in case of wrongful life by 
issuing a claim on behalf of the child) is that the health-care provider’s 
negligence deprived them of the opportunity to have a choice regarding family 
planning. Thus, these claims have potential only in case of misdiagnosis or 
breach of other contractual obligations (primarily the breach of the health-care 
provider’s obligation to inform the patient). In this regard, these cases can in 
principle be treated as any other case of health-care provider’s liability, where 
the damage has been caused by the health-care provider’s negligent act.14 
However, the existence of damage as a prerequisite for the health care 
provider’s liability, as well as the damage subject to compensation, remain the 
central problems that have not found uniform solutions.  
The objective of this dissertation is to ascertain whether and to what 
extent the health-care provider should be liable for damages under Estonian 
civil law in cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life, 
                                                                          
12  The so-called prenatal delicts have been deliberately left unregulated in DCFR (Draft 
Common Frame of Reference, VI book) and these delicts are not regarded as infliction of 
damage to health. However, if the child is damaged before his or her birth, upon reaching the 
legal capacity the child could have a claim against the tortfeasor. von Bar, C. Principles of 
European Law. Study Group on a European Civil Code. Non-Contractual Liability Arising 
out of Damage Caused to Another (PEL Liab. Dam.). Sellier. European law publishers Gmbh, 
Munich, Study Group on a European Civil Code 2009. DCFR 2:201, commentary no 1. 
13  E.g. wrongful life actions have been barred in French law for disabled children born after 
7 March 2002. The so-called anti-Perruche provision was enacted after the notorious 
decision of the French Cour de cassation of 17 November 2000, by which the court satisfied 
the wrongful life claim issued in the name of Nicolas Perruche, a boy who was born 
suffering from an extremely severe handicap. B. Winiger et al (see Note 1), pp. 940‒942. 
After the stipulation of the anti-Perruche provision under French law in case of birth of a 
disabled child, parents are able to seek damages from health-care providers only in respect of 
harm suffered by the parents (i.e. emotional harm), but not the pecuniary damage resulting 
from the child’s disability. See also N. M. Priaulx, Conceptualising harm in the case of the 
‘unwanted’ child. – European Journal of Health Law, Vol. 9/4, 2002, pp. 339‒340. P. Lewis, 
‘The necessary implications of wrongful life claims: lessons from France’, European Journal 
of Health Law, 12/2005, p. 136. 
14  E.g. in Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that the parents’ cause of action for damages caused 
by negligence in the performance and interpretation of an amniocentesis (i.e. the case of 
wrongful birth) involves the application of the doctrine of negligence to a recently developed 
medical procedure. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F. Supp. 692 
(E.D. Pa. 1978). 
13 
considering an outcome that seeks to balance the interests of the child, his 
or her parents and the health-care provider. 
In order to achieve the objective of the work, the author poses the following 
research questions: 
 
1. Is the health-care provider’s contractual or delictual liability or both under 
Estonian law possible in the cases of prenatal damages? 
2. Should the damage be compensated in the cases of wrongful conception, and 
if so, what kind of damage is reasonable to compensate? 
3. Should the damage be compensated in the cases of wrongful birth, and if so, 
what kind of damage is reasonable to compensate?  
4. Should the maintenance costs be compensated in the cases of wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth?  
5. Whether (and to what extent) the scope of compensating the damages in the 
cases of wrongful conception and wrongful birth is affected by the principle 
that the injured person’s benefits should be deducted from the compen-
sation? 
6. Whether (and to what extent), as the injured party, the parents’ part in the 
caused damage should be taken into account in establishing the scope of 
compensating the damages in the cases of wrongful conception and 
wrongful birth? 
 
The first research question considers primarily Estonian law. The rest of the 
research questions are of a universal character. 
 
 
2.2. Defining the topic 
2.2.1. The health-care provider as an obliged subject  
to compensate for damages 
The starting point of the health-care provider’s liability in the cases of prenatal 
damages under Estonian law is the breach of contract for provision of health-
care services. In order to establish the circle of persons who could be held liable 
for the damage arising from the unwanted pregnancy or the birth of an 
unwanted child, it is necessary to define the concept of the health-care 
provider.15 
                                                                          
15  In Estonian law, the concept of the health-care provider is enacted in HSOA and in LOA. 
In these acts, the health-care provider is defined differently regarding the health-care pro-
fessional. According to HSOA, health-care professionals (i.e. doctors, dentists, nurses and 
midwives) are also health-care providers (HSOA § 3 [1]), whereas under LOA, the health-
care professionals are not regarded as health-care providers. According to LOA, the health-
care professionals are persons who participate in the provision of health-care services, 
operating on the basis of an employment contract or other similar contract with the health-
care provider (LOA § 758 [2]). It has been stated that the regulation of the health-care 
14 
In this dissertation, the regulation in LOA is taken as the basis for the 
concept of the health-care provider. According to LOA § 758 (1), a health-care 
provider is a person in whose professional activities provides health-care 
service to a patient. LOA § 758 (2) regards qualified doctors and dentists, and 
nurses or midwives providing health care services independently as persons 
participating in the provision of health-care services. Generally, a health-care 
provider in the meaning of LOA is a legal person who runs a hospital or a sole 
proprietor.16 A natural person can also be a health-care provider if he operates in 
the form of a sole proprietor (e.g. family physician, see HSOA Section 7 (2)) or 
if the contract between the person providing health-care services and the health-
care provider is other than an employment contract or other similar contract.17 
For example in Germany, analogously to Estonia, the health-care provider is 
understood as a legal person (e.g. state and private hospitals) or a natural person 
(e.g. the health-care professional providing the health-care services inde-
pendently in the private sector).18 
Although the contract for provision of health-care services is concluded 
between the patient and the health-care provider, the persons participating in 
providing the health-care services shall also be personally liable besides the 
health-care provider for performance of a contract for the provision of health 
care services (LOA § 758 (2)).19 It has been explained that the legislator has 
aimed to increase the doctor’s civil liability because the patient trusts his most 
fundamental and valuable objects of utility in the hands of the doctor. At the 
same time, as an employee, the doctor’s pecuniary liability is limited and thus in 
reality, the doctor’s liability is not extensive.20  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provider in HSOA is unsuccessful and confusing (A. Nõmper, J. Sootak. Meditsiiniõigus 
[Medical Law]. Juura 2007 [in Estonian], p. 57).  
16  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 295, para 3.2. The Republic of Estonia can be also regarded as 
a health-care provider, if the health-care service is provided in prison. See e.g. the Supreme 
Court’s decision 3-2-4-1-16 of 8 December 2016. 
17  A. Nõmper, J. Sootak (see Note 15), p. 57. 
18  M. S. Stauch. Medical malpractice and compensation in Germany. – Chicago-Kent Law 
Review, Vol. 86/3, 2011, p. 1140. 
19  Besides the persons providing or participating in the provision of health care services, the 
liability of other persons is not excluded in the case of unwanted pregnancy or the birth of a 
disabled child. For instance, the parent(s) could also rely e.g. on the product liability of a 
drug company. Also, in principle the child could have a claim against the parents, if the 
disability was caused due to the parent’s behaviour during the pregnancy (e.g. unhealthy 
habits of the mother, injuring the foetus during the pregnancy). However, this dissertation 
concentrates on contractual and delictual liability of the persons providing or participating in 
provision of health care services, and potential liability of other persons is not analysed. The 
dissertation also does not cover the health-care provider’s liability should the disability of 
the child have been caused by the health-care provider, e.g. should the child’s disability have 
been caused by the health-care provider’s negligently performed delivery of the child. Still, 
the general framework of the prerequisites of the health-care provider’s obligation to 
compensate for the damages analysed is applicable to all the cases of the health-care 
provider’s liability (see para 2.2.2.). 
20  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 296, para 3.3.  
15 
If the prerequisites for the personal liability of the persons participating in 
the provision of health-care services are fulfilled, they are liable in front of the 
patient together with the health-care provider as solidary obligors.21 
In addition to the health-care provider’s own liability (LOA § 770 (1)), the 
health-care provider is also liable under LOA § 770 (2) for the actions of the 
persons assisting in providing health-care services (i.e. persons assisting the 
health-care provider who are not personally liable under LOA § 758 (2)). The 
main difference as regards the health-care provider’s liability in this regard is 
that fault is a prerequisite for a liability only under the meaning of liability set 
forth in LOA § 770 (1).22 
LOA § 770 (2) basically repeats the regulation in General Part of the Civil 
Code Act (GPCCA)23 § 132 (1), according to which a person shall be liable for 
the conduct of and circumstances arising from another person as for the 
person’s own conduct and circumstances arising from the person if the person 
uses the other person on a continuous basis in the economic or professional 
activity of the person and the conduct of and circumstances arising from the 
other person are related to such economic or professional activity.24  
The activity of the person participating in providing the health-care services 
(e.g. doctor) should be attributed to the health-care provider according to 
GPCCA) § 132 (1). If the doctor and the health-care provider have concluded 
an employment contract or other similar contract (contract for provision of a 
service), according to which the doctor provides the service to the health care 
provider, it means using the doctor on a continuous basis in the economic or 
professional activity of the health-care provider. Another prerequisite to 
attribute the doctor’s activity to the health-care provider is the relation of the 
activity or omission to the economic or professional activity.25 If the doctor as 
the health-care provider’s employee provides the health-care service to the 
patient, there shall be no doubt that provision of these services is related to the 
health-care provider’s economic or professional activity, because this activity is 
directly related to the contract concluded between the doctor and the health-care 
provider.26  
                                                                          
21  This means that in the case of breach of contract for provision of health-care services, the 
patient may claim damages from all the obligors jointly and severally (LOA § 65 [1]). 
22  See more at para 2.2.1. 
23  General Part of the Civil Code Act. State Gazette I 2002, 35, 216. 
24  See also I. Luik. Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja ja arsti vastutus. Tervishoiuteenuse osutamise 
leping XXII (The liability of health-care provider and of the doctor. The contract for 
provision of health-care services XXII). – Lege Artis 11/2004, p. 34. 
25  P. Varul et al (eds). Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. Komm vlj. (The General Part of the 
Civil Code Act). Tallinn: Juura 2010 (in Estonian), pp. 386–387. 
26  To apply GPCCA § 132 (1) person A must have behaved in a way that can be reproached 
with person B who uses person A in his economic or professional activity in the context of 
the contract concluded between them. The Supreme Court’s decision 3-2-1-92-05 of 13 Oc-
tober 2005, para 17. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Estonia are available at www.nc.ee 
(in Estonian). 
16 
If the doctor’s unlawful activity is not related to the performing of the 
health-care provider’s contractual obligations and the doctor does not breach 
these obligations, the activity can be attributed under LOA § 1054 (1) on the 
grounds of delictual liability.27 As both legal person and natural person can 
commit a delict, both can be liable on the grounds of the law of delicts.28 
I. Luik-Tamme has stated that the doctor’s liability is delictual in its legal 
nature.29 In the opinion of the author of this dissertation, the aforenamed 
allegation cannot be correct in the context of LOA § 758 (2). Although the 
doctor is not party to the contract between the patient and the health-care 
provider, the doctor is still personally liable for the performance of the contract 
beside the health-care provider. Thus it can be alleged that the obligations 
arising from the abovementioned contract extend to the doctor, who is also 
personally liable for breach of these obligations according to LOA § 758 (2). In 
addition, the doctor’s liability under LOA § 758 (2) does not exclude his 
delictual liability, but it has been stated that claim on the delictual basis should 
be regarded as rather exceptional, because the claim under the law of delict is 
generally issued against the health-care provider and not the doctor participating 
in providing the health-care services.30  
 
 
2.2.2. The general framework of the prerequisites of the health-care 
provider’s obligation to compensate for damages 
As the health-care provider shall not promise a patient that an operation will be 
successful (LOA § 766 (2)), the basis of the health-care provider’s liability does 
not lie in a negative outcome to the provision of health-care services.31  
According to the Estonian Supreme Court, the general prerequisites of the 
contractual liability and the obligation to compensate for the damages are the 
following:  
 
1)  The obligor has breached the contract (LOA § 115 (1));  
2)  The obligor is liable for the breach of contract (LOA § 115 (1));  
3)  Obligee has suffered or suffers damages (LOA § 127 (1), § 128);  
4)  The damage is covered by the protective purpose of the breached obligation 
(LOA § 127 (2)); 
5)  The damage as a possible result of the breach of obligation was foreseeable 
for the obligor upon the entry into the contract, except for infliction of 
damage intentionally or due to gross negligence (LOA § 127 (3)); 
                                                                          
27  P. Varul et al (see Note 25), pp. 387–388. 
28  P. Varul et al (see Note 4) pp. 629–630, para 3.4.1.  
29  I. Luik. Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja ja arsti vastutus. Tervishoiuteenuse osutamise leping 
XXI (The health-care provider’s and the doctor’s liability. The contract for provision of 
health-care services XXI). – Lege Artis 11/2004, p. 34. 
30  A. Nõmper, J. Sootak, (see Note 15), p. 137. 
31  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 305, para 3.3. 
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6)  There is a causal link between the breach of obligation and the damage 
(LOA § 127 (4)).32 
 
Under the Estonian LOA, the breach of obligation by the health-care 
provider (LOA § 770 (1) and (2)) is the central basis for the health-care 
provider’s obligation to compensate for the damage arising from the contract 
(LOA § 115). 
 
The performance of the health-care provider’s obligations must be evaluated 
considering the first sentence of LOA § 762, which states that health care 
services shall at the very least conform to the general level of medical science at 
the time the services are provided and the services shall be provided with a level 
of care which can normally be expected of providers of health care services. 
The Estonian Supreme Court has stated that if the quality of the doctor’s actions 
is less than that of an educated and experienced specialist in the specific field, 
this could be considered a medical error.33 
The basis for the health care provider’s liability can also be the breach of 
obligations caused by the health-care provider’s assisting personnel, as well as 
errors of equipment used during the provision of health care services (LOA 
§ 770 (2)) and organisational errors, such as failure to prevent hospital in-
fections.34 
In addition to the breach of obligation, the damage and the causal link 
between the damage and the breach of obligation should also precede the 
obligation to compensate for the damage. If it is determined that there is an 
error in diagnosis or treatment and a patient develops a health disorder which 
could probably have been avoided by ordinary treatment, the damage is 
presumed to have resulted from the error (LOA § 770 (4)).  
In addition, the prerequisite for liability is the health care provider’s fault, 
i.e. he must have breached the obligation culpably (LOA § 770 (1)).35 The 
Estonian Supreme Court has explained that if the health-care provider’s breach 
of obligation lies in misdiagnosis or medical error, the existence of fault 
consists of negligently or intentionally assigning an incorrect diagnosis or 
treatment, including failure to assign a correct diagnosis and treatment.36 In 
principle, the health-care provider’s fault could be excluded if the health-care 
provider is not able to influence the course of events.37  
                                                                          
32  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-130-15 of 25 November 2015, para 11. 
33  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-78-06 of 3 October 2006, para 12. 
34  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 312, para 3.2. 
35  Fault is not a prerequisite for the health-care provider’s liability if the basis of liability is 
LOA § 770 (2). P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 312, para 3.2. 
36  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-171-10 of 8 April 2011, para 17. 
37  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 312, para 3.2. I. Luik-Tamme and K. Pormeister have stated 
that it is incorrect to regard fault as not decisive in establishing the health-care provider’s 
liability. In their opinion, whether or not the health-care provider could be reproached for the 
negligence should be determined on the basis of establishing the fault, not on the basis of 
breach of obligation. See more at I. Luik-Tamme, K. Pormeister. Kas süü tervishoiuteenuse 
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In the occurrence of these prerequisites of the health-care provider’s 
contractual liability it is possible to move to the next stage and assess which 
kind of damage should be compensable to the patient. 
The existence of the health-care provider’s contractual liability does not 
exclude the application of the liability under the law of delicts. Under LOA § 
1044 (3) the tortfeasor shall be liable for the breach of contractual obligation 
also under tort law, if as a result of the violation of this obligation death, bodily 
injury or damage to the health of the patient was caused. In such a situation, the 
victim has a choice as to the legal basis on which he wants to issue a claim. The 
Estonian Supreme Court has affirmed the existence of such a right to choose.38 
Additionally, the claim under tort law is present when the aim of the breached 
contractual obligation was other than preventing such damage for which 
compensation is claimed (LOA § 1044 (2) second sentence).  
The general prerequisites for delictual liability in Estonia (LOA § 1043 et 
seq) are the objective elements of tort (der objektive Tatbestand: the tortfeasor’s 
act, harming the victim’s legally protected right and a causal relation between 
them), unlawfulness and the fault of the tortfeasor. 
Considering proving the causal link, the Supreme Court has held that if the 
person’s death is caused by bodily injury due to the defendant’s negligence or 
alternatively by circumstances that do not relate to the defendant’s act (e.g. the 
poor condition of a person’s health), then the claimant should only prove that 
the infliction of damage by the defendant’s act was a possible cause of the 
damage.39 Similarly to contractual liability, in the case of the damage claim on 
the basis of the law of delict, after establishing the prerequisites for the liability 
it is necessary to analyse whether the victim has suffered compensable damage 
under the law of delict.  
According to LOA § 1045 (1), the causing of damage is unlawful if, above all, 
the damage is caused by: 1) causing of the death of the victim; 2) causing of 
bodily injury to or harm to the health of the victim; 3) deprivation of the victim of 
his or her liberty; 4) violation of a personality right of the victim; 5) violation of 
the right of ownership or a similar right, or a right of possession, of the victim; 
6) interference with a person’s economic or professional activities; 7) behaviour 
that violates a duty arising from the law; or 8) intentional behaviour contrary to 
good morals. In LOA § 1045 (1), paras. 1–3 and 5, the unlawfulness of the act is 
defined in terms of consequences of the tortfeasor’s act or inaction.40 The grounds 
for unlawfulness under LOA § 1045 (1), paras. 6–8, necessitate the evaluation of 
the tortfeasor’s act or inaction and not the consequence.41 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
osutaja lepingulise vastutuse eeldusena on iseseisev või sisutühi kontseptsioon? (Is the fault 
as a prerequisite for the health-care provider’s liability an independent or an empty con-
ception?). – Juridica, Vol. X, 2014 (in Estonian).  
38  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-171-10 of 8 April 2011, para 12.  
39  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-53-06 of 26 September 2006, para 11. 
40  T. Tampuu. Lepinguvälised võlasuhted (Non-contractual obligations). Juura 2012 (in 
Estonian), p. 203.  
41  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 641.  
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Another prerequisite for delictual liability is fault42, which is established on two 
stages. Firstly, the intentional or negligent infliction of damage should be 
established (LOA § 1050 (1)). Then, in case of negligent infliction of damage, it is 
evaluated whether the negligence is subjectively excusable (LOA § 1050 (2)).43 
The latter means the assessment of the situation, age, education, knowledge, 
abilities and other personal characteristics of a person (LOA § 1050 (2)). However, 
according to Estonian case law, the fault of the health-care provider as a 
professional is not evaluated under LOA § 1050 (2).44 
If the prerequisites for contractual or delictual liability have been 
established, it can provide a basis for compensation of both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary damage. The general rules of compensation for the damages 
are applicable equally regardless of the basis of the health-care provider’s 
obligation to compensate for the damages (LOA § 115 or § 1043).45  
The compensable pecuniary damage can be a direct damage (LOA § 128 
(3)) or a loss of profit (LOA § 128 (4)). Non-pecuniary damage involves pri-
marily the physical and emotional distress and suffering caused to the aggrieved 
(LOA § 128 (5)).46 
According to the Estonian LOA, the aim for compensation for damage is 
to place the aggrieved person in a situation as near as possible to that in which 
he or she would have been if the circumstances that are the basis for the 
compensation obligation had not occurred (LOA § 127 (1)). However, the 
principle of complete compensation of the damage is limited by several 
provisions.  
The purpose of the breached obligation or the protective provision should be 
taken into account according to § 127 (2) irrespective of the legal basis for 
compensation for the damage. LOA § 127 (2) stipulates that the damage shall 
not be compensated to the extent that prevention of damage was not the purpose 
of the obligation or provision due to the non-performance of which the 
compensation obligation arose.47 In the case of liability arising from breach of 
contract, the law does not allow for the compensation of damage which could 
                                                                          
42  See also J. Lahe. Süü deliktiõiguses (Fault in the Law of Delict). Dissertation. Tartu 2005. – 
Available at http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/686/lahejanno.pdf?sequence=5 
(27.03.2017) 
43  T. Tampuu (see Note 40), pp. 230–231.  
44  Decision in case no 3-2-1-78-06 of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of 3 October 
2006, para 12. See also J. Lahe. The Concept of Fault of the Tortfeasor in Estonian Tort Law: 
A Comparative Perspective. – Review of Central and East European Law, Vol. 38, 2, 2013, 
p. 153.  
45  P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus I. Üldosa (§§ 1–207) Komm vlj (Law of Obligations Act 
I, General part: A Commentary). Juura 2016 (in Estonian), p. 652. 
46  It should be added that LOA (§ 134 in particular) has exhaustively regulated the cases in 
which the non-pecuniary damage should be compensated. See also the Supreme Court’s 
decision in case no 3-2-1-43-08 of 28 May 2008, para 14. 
47  The person who has breached the contract is not regarded as responsible for the kind of 
damage, the arising of which the performance of the contract was not aimed to prevent. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-171-10 of 8 April 2011, para 15. 
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not have been foreseeable to the non-conforming party at the time of entering 
into the contract (LOA § 127 (3)).48 Also, LOA § 127 (5) has to be taken into 
account, under which any gain received by the injured party as a result of the 
damage caused, particularly the costs avoided by the injured party, shall be 
deducted from the compensation for the damage unless deduction is contrary to 
the purpose of the compensation. 
The compensation for the damage could also be reduced if the damage was 
caused in part due to the victim’s behaviour or if the complete compensation 
would not be fair towards the tortfeasor. LOA § 139 (1) stipulates that if 
damage is caused in part by circumstances dependent on the injured party or 
due to a risk borne by the injured party, the amount of compensation for the 
damage shall be reduced to the extent that such circumstances or risk 
contributed to the damage. The second section of the same provision enables the 
reduction of the amount of compensation, if the aggrieved person failed to draw 
the attention of the person causing the damage to an unusually high risk of 
damage or to prevent the risk of damage or to perform any act which would 
have reduced the damage caused if the aggrieved person could have reasonably 
been expected to do so.49 LOA § 140 (1) enacts that the court may reduce the 
amount of compensation for damage if compensation in full would be grossly 
unfair with regard to the obligated person or not reasonably acceptable for any 
other reason. In such case, all circumstances, in particular the nature of the 
liability, relationships between the persons and their economic situations, 
including insurance coverage, shall be taken into account. 
 
 
2.2.3. Cases of prenatal damages 
2.2.3.1. Wrongful conception 
Wrongful conception cases (also known as wrongful pregnancy cases) involve 
the parent’s or parents’ claim against the health care provider to compensate for 
damages arising from the birth of an unwanted but healthy child due to the 
health care provider’s negligence. Cases of wrongful conception are thus 
characterised by the fact that the parents had wanted to avoid pregnancy, but 
due to an error on the part of the health-care provider the parents were not able 
to prevent the birth of a child.50  
                                                                          
48  The Supreme Court in the decision in case no 3-2-1-53-06 of 26 September 2006 has 
noted that LOA § 127 (2) and (3) therefore enable the court to disregard these negative 
consequences of the breach of contractual obligation, which are in the causal relation to the 
breach of the contract, but are extraordinary in the view of a reasonable person. 
49  It should be therefore added that in the case of causing the person’s death or bodily harm 
the compensation could be reduced under LOA § 139 (1) only if the injured person’s intent 
or gross negligence contributed to the injury suffered (LOA § 139 [3]). 
50  E.g. the health-care provider negligently performs a sterilisation procedure and, as a 
proximate result of that negligence, the patient conceives a child. See e.g. the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in the case Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247; 492 S.E.2d 126 (1997). 
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In case of unwanted pregnancy, the conduct alleged against the health-care 
provider could lie in the negligence in procedures preventing or terminating the 
pregnancy51 or pregnancy diagnoses.52 Also, the health care provider may err in 
advice or recommendation on contraception method or give an incorrect 
diagnosis of fertility.53 The health-care provider’s negligent behaviour could 
also lie in pre-operative counselling, the operation itself, post-operative testing 
or post-operative counselling (e.g. if there is, for instance, a failure to warn of 
the need to use contraceptives until sperm tests after vasectomy have proved 
negative).54  
S. D. Pattinson has alleged that in wrongful conception cases, the major 
ethical tension is over the value to be attached to the autonomous decision of 
those whose opportunity to avoid having a child has been lost.55  
In Estonia, TPSA § 6 (1) permits the abortion of pregnancy that has not 
lasted longer than 11 weeks. Therefore, in a situation where the woman is 
carrying a healthy, though unwanted, baby, the law enables a decision to be 
made in favour of either termination of pregnancy regardless of reason. 
However, if the existence of pregnancy is not detected in a timely manner (i.e. 
prior to the 11 week mark), then in case of a unwanted pregnancy the possibility 
to choose to abort the carrying of a healthy baby is only allowed if good reason 
exists.56  
 
 
  
                                                                          
51  Estonian Supreme Court has held that since this is a medical intervention into a woman’s 
bodily integrity, the termination of the pregnancy can be considered as providing health-
care. The Supreme Court’s decision in case no. 3-2-1-31-11 of 11 May 2011, para 11. 
52  See J. K. Mason, G. T. Laurie, M. Aziz. Law and Medical Ethics. 8th Edition, Oxford 
University Press 2011, pp. 340‒341. E.g. according to the decision of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina in the case of Jackson v. Bumgardner, the unplanned child was born after the 
health-care provider had failed to reinsert a contraceptive intrauterine device after a surgical 
procedure of dilation and curettage, but reassured the patient that she would continue to be 
protected by the intrauterine device (Jackson v. Bumgardner, No. 670A84, 318 N.C. 172; 
3478 S. E. 2d 743 [1986]).  
53  S. D. Pattinson. Medical Law and Ethics. Second Edition, Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limi-
ted 2009, p. 311. 
54  A. Grubb, J. Laing, J. McHale. Principles of Medical Law. 3rd Edition. Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2010, pp. 295–296. 
55  S. D. Pattinson (see Note 53), p. 333. 
56  According to TPSA § 6 (2), pregnancy which has lasted for more than 12 but less than 22 
weeks may be terminated if: 1) the pregnancy endangers the pregnant woman’s health; 2) the 
unborn child may have a severe mental or physical damage to health; 3) the illness or health 
problem of a pregnant woman hinders the raising of a child; 4) the pregnant woman is below 
the age of 15; 5) the pregnant woman is over the age of 45. 
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2.2.3.2. Wrongful birth 
In a case of wrongful birth, the parents seek compensation for any damage 
related to birth of the disabled child, a situation that would have been prevented 
had the parents been correctly informed.57 The main difference between a case 
of wrongful conception and one of wrongful birth is that in the latter the birth of 
a child was sought.58 It should be noted that the combination of the mentioned 
two cases is also possible if a woman becomes pregnant e.g. due to negligent 
sterilisation or abortion (which leads to a wrongful conception claim), and gives 
birth to a disabled child (which stems from a negligent diagnosis and leads to a 
wrongful birth claim). 
There are various invasive and non-invasive methods of prenatal testing for 
the detection of possible foetal defects.59 However, it should be clear that the 
health-care provider cannot always prevent the birth of a disabled child even 
when the testing is performed 100% correctly. Although prenatal genetic testing 
is considered highly accurate, the potential for errors still exists.60  
It is important to emphasise that in these cases the health-care provider has 
not caused the disability. Rather the conduct alleged against the health-care 
provider lies in negligence in performing genetic or prenatal testing, the fol-
lowing misdiagnosis regarding the foetus’ health condition and the consequent 
loss of opportunity of the mother to terminate the pregnancy in a timely manner.61  
The cases of wrongful birth raise several ethical and moral concerns, which 
lead to the main question of whether these cases should be accepted as 
perspective causes of action. Some countries have chosen to bar these claims.62  
                                                                          
57  It should be noted that various authors apply different meanings to the term wrongful 
birth. E.g. M. Hogg regards the claims in respect of both healthy and disabled children as 
claims under the rubric of wrongful birth. See M. Hogg. Damages for pecuniary loss in cases 
of wrongful birth. – Journal of European Tort Law, Vol. 1/2, 2010.  
58  B. Winiger et al (eds.) (see Note 1), p. 934 
59  On the possibilities and risks of prenatal testing methods, see J. K. Mason et al (see Note 
52), pp. 215–216; D. W. Whitney, K. N. Rosenbaum. Recovery of damages for wrongful 
birth. – The Journal of Legal Medicine, Vol. 32/2, 2011., pp. 168–169; P. L. Barber. Prenatal 
diagnosis: An ethical and regulatory dilemma. – Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy, 
Vol. 13/2, 2013, pp. 330–332, 345. 
60  For more information, see D. W. Whitney, K. N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), p. 170.  
61  E.g. according to the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of Berman 
v. Allan the health-care provider had failed to inform the patient of the existence of a 
procedure known as amniocentesis, which would have enabled the discovery that the child 
would suffer from Down’s Syndrome (Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421 (1979) 404 A.2d 8). 
According to the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of Gleitman v. 
Cosgrove, the parents of a rubella syndrome child brought an action against a physician who 
allegedly had advised them that the mother’s contraction of rubella during pregnancy would 
not affect the foetus (Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22 (1967) 227 A.2d 689). 
62  E.g. the statues of U.S. several states prohibit wrongful birth claims, focusing on barring 
plaintiffs from making the argument that, but for the negligence of the defendant, the 
plaintiff would have chosen to terminate the pregnancy. C. Harris has concluded that 
although the policy behind wrongful birth claims are politically and morally controversial, 
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According to S.D. Pattinson, in cases of wrongful birth, the major ethics-
related tension is over the value to be attached to the autonomous decision of 
those who have been deprived of the opportunity to avoid having a child with 
particular traits.63 The parents’ right to make an informed decision on whether 
or not to abort a child with potential birth defects is opposed by the distasteful 
potential to create ‘designer babies’ and for discrimination against disabled 
people.64 This leads to the need to evaluate what conditions are ‘medically 
relevant’ and could accordingly give rise to a wrongful-birth cause of action. 
Moral concerns as to the status of foetal life remain, alongside the fact that in 
absolute terms pregnancy has been actually sought in the cases at issue.65  
In case of the birth of a disabled child the parents could be obliged to face 
the heavy burden of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage through deprivation 
of their right to choose due to the health-care provider’s negligence. However, 
the compensation of named damages depends on the fulfilment of the pre-
requisites of the health-care provider’s liability.  
 
 
2.2.3.3. Wrongful life 
By the claim of wrongful life, the child alleges that he/she has suffered damage 
through having been born disabled for reason of misdiagnosis and the 
consequent loss of opportunity of the mother to terminate the pregnancy in a 
timely manner. The facts underlying the wrongful life case are generally the 
same as in case of wrongful birth. Wrongful life cases are distinguished from 
wrongful birth cases by the fact that the child born disabled is the one who 
issues a claim against the health care provider for the inflicted damage.66  
Wrongful-life claims are the most controversial among the cases of prenatal 
damages. In the U.S., only a few states allow such claims.67 In Germany, it has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the essential tenets of the claim are the same as those for medical malpractice. Thus, these 
claims should be decided by the judicial system and should not be interfered by the state 
legislatures by prohibiting the claims. C. Harris. Statutory Prohibitions on Wrongful Birth 
Claims and Their Dangerous Effects on Parents. – Boston College Journal of Law & Social 
Justice, Vol. 34/2, 2014, p. 377, 391.  
63  S. D. Pattinson (see Note 53), p. 333. 
64  P. L. Barber (see Note 59), pp. 347, 349. 
65  J. K. Mason et al (see Note 52), p. 353. 
66  About differentiating the cases of prenatal damages, see also B. A. Koch ‘Medical Liability 
in Europe: Comparative Analysis’ in B. A. Koch (ed.). Medical Liability in Europe. A 
Comparison of Selected Jurisdictions. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2011, pp. 611‒691, at p. 
672; K. A. Mahoney. Malpractice Claims Resulting from Negligent Preconception Genetic 
Testing: Do These Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Conception, and 
Does the Categorization Even Matter? – Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 39, 2006, p. 773. 
67  Claims of wrongful life are allowed in California (e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 
966 (Cal. 1982), New Jersey (e.g., Moscatello v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N. J., 776 
A.2d 874, 881 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), and Washington (e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 Wash. 1983).  
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been stated that as a matter of principle, a human being has to accept his life as 
nature endowed him and has no claim against others to be born or eliminated. 
Thus the child’s existence cannot be classified as damage.68 
The fact that the claimant in the wrongful life claim is the child, who at the 
time of the health-care provider’s negligent act was not yet born, poses complex 
ethical and philosophical problems regarding the existence of the health-care 
provider’s obligations towards the child, the existence of the damage suffered 
and the health-care provider’s subsequent liability. The courts that satisfy 
wrongful life claims tend to look past the ethical and philosophical obstacles 
and concentrate on the medical needs and corresponding expenses of a disabled 
child.69 
The main obstacle in satisfying the claim lies in the question of whether the 
child has suffered a legally cognisable damage and whether it is possible to 
overcome the non-existence paradox.70 The non-existence paradox is created 
by the comparison of the states of being born disabled and not being born at all. 
  
                                                                          
68  N. M. Priaulx (see Note 13), p. 339.  
69  K. Wevers. Prenatal torts and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. – Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology, Vol. 24/1, 2010, p. 266. 
70  E.g Gleitman v. Cosgrove (see Note 61).  
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3. CURRENT STATUS OF THE FIELD OF RESEARCH AND 
THE POSITION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM THEREIN 
Although it could be alleged that the cases of prenatal damages are very specific 
due to the nature of occurring damage and thus constitute a very narrow part of 
the health-care provider’s liability, these cases have received remarkable 
attention in the discussions all over the world. For example, the compositions 
analysing the law of delict in its entirety have devoted whole chapters to the 
cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life.71 Thus the 
named cases represent an intriguing research subject. What makes these cases 
even more interesting is the fact that debate over the matter is not limited to 
legal questions, but broadens to fundamental questions of morals and ethics. 
The answers to the questions concerning the health-care provider’s liability and 
the obligation to compensate for the damages and the scope of recoverable 
damages have not been uniform. Consequently, the relevance of seeking 
solutions to the named cases exists also in Estonia.  
The cases of prenatal damages have received remarkable attention in several 
countries. On the contrary, in Estonia the question of the health-care provider’s 
liability in these specific cases has not been analysed at all. 
After the stipulation of provisions regarding the contract for provision of 
health-care services in LOA, the health-care provider’s contractual liability has 
been analysed in the Estonian legal literature. Ants Nõmper composed the 
commentary to chapter 41 (‘Contract for the Provision of Health-care Services’) 
of LOA72 and in conjunction with Professor Jaan Sootak the book ‘Medical 
law’.73 Another major contributor to analysis of the health-care provider’s 
liability has been Ingeri Luik-Tamme, who published a series of articles 
regarding the contract for provision of health-care services.74  
The main contributors to the analysis of the Estonian law of delicts are 
Professor Janno Lahe and magister iuris Tambet Tampuu, who have thoroughly 
analysed the law of non-contractual obligations and the prerequisites of 
delictual liability.75  
Alike the absence of case law in Estonia regarding the cases of wrongful 
conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life, these cases have not at all been 
analysed in the Estonian legal literature. In the book ‘Medical law’, Ants 
Nõmper and Jaan Sootak have referred to the complexity of the question of the 
health-care provider’s liability and the compensation for the damages in the 
                                                                          
71  B. Winiger et al. Digest of European Tort Law. Volume 1: Essential Cases on Natural 
Causation. Springer-Verlag/Wien 2007; B. Winiger et al (see Note 1). 
72  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), pp. 293‒315. 
73  A. Nõmper, J. Sootak (see Note 15). 
74  E.g. I. Luik (see Note 24), I. Luik (see Note 29), I. Luik-Tamme, K. Pormeister (see Note 37).  
75  E.g. T. Tampuu (see Note 40). J. Lahe (see Note 42). 
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cases of failure to perform abortion or unsuccessful sterilisation or termination 
of pregnancy.76  
Also, there is no exhaustive analysis regarding the health-care provider’s 
liability under the law of delicts, although the Estonian Supreme Court has not 
excluded the possibility of the health-care provider’s delictual liability.77  
  
                                                                          
76  A. Nõmper, J. Sootak (see Note 15), p. 154‒156. 
77  See above para 2.2.2. 
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4. METHODS  
The main research method of this dissertation is the comparative method. The 
use of the named method is expressed in analysing the research questions 
comparatively in Estonian, German and U.S. law. 
Despite the availability of the legal grounds to issue a claim against the 
health-care provider in the cases of damage to the patient, the Estonian courts 
have not had the possibility to tackle the specific legal questions arising in the 
cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life.  
In contrast, the debate over the questions in the cases of prenatal damages has 
been continuous in Germany. There is also numerous court practice in these cases 
in Germany. In addition, the German legal system, including German law (and 
also the standpoints established in case law and theoretical sources), has set an 
important example for the creation of Estonian civil law.78 Also the German Civil 
Code (BGB) was the main model law for the Estonian Law of Obligations Act.  
U.S. law as an example of common law was selected in expectation of finding 
discussions of universal character that would be applicable also in Estonian case 
law. The U.S. has also numerous case law in the cases of prenatal damages. 
Due to the absence of the court practice in the cases of wrongful conception, 
wrongful birth and wrongful life in Estonia, it is not possible to analyse the 
standpoints of the Estonian courts in these cases. Thus, the author has analysed 
the court practice in German and U.S. courts. The experience of the legal 
studies and the case law in the countries under comparison enable us to find 
solutions to the analysed cases also under Estonian law.  
More specifically, the analysis of the judicial practice has given examples of 
the circumstances under which the health-care provider has been held liable in 
these cases and the courts’ argumentation pro or contra compensation for the 
different kinds of damages. The analysis of the legal literature enabled the study 
of the findings regarding the tendency and direction of the case law in these 
cases, also the broader approach to the legal problems, as well as moral and 
ethical concerns in the cases of prenatal damages.  
As a result of setting the parallels in law and judicial practice in the countries 
under comparison, the author has been able to ascertain the main arguments 
regarding the compensation for the damages in cases of wrongful conception, 
wrongful birth and wrongful life and the effect of these arguments in the context 
of the Estonian LOA. However, the author does not aim to copy over into the 
Estonian context the standpoints established in German and the U.S. case law, 
but rather evaluate the suitability of the offered solutions for Estonian law. 
Furthermore, the author has evaluated the solutions proposed by German and 
U.S. law in the light of Estonian case law regarding compensation for the 
damages and the prerequisites for the health-care provider’s liability.  
                                                                          
78  See P. Varul et al. Tsiviilõiguse üldosa (General Part of Civil Law). Juura 2012, p. 25 (in 
Estonian). 
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5. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
OF THE PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED  
IN THIS COMPENDIUM  
5.1. The health-care provider’s contractual and  
delictual liability 
5.1.1. The obligation of the health-care provider to compensate  
for damages under contract law and under the law of delicts  
in case of wrongful conception 
Description of the Problem 
The question of the health-care provider’s liability in the cases of wrongful 
conception raises a legitimate doubt: whether an unwanted pregnancy can 
constitute an injury, which can be followed by the health-care provider’s 
obligation to compensate the consequent damage.  
As M. Ramsay has pointed out, some authors and judges still question 
whether pregnancy as a natural condition can be considered a genuine injury.79 
This dissertation is based on the assumption that unwanted pregnancy in the 
cases of wrongful conception is the result of the health-care provider’s 
negligence (i.e. medical error or misdiagnosis) and constitutes an injury.  
According to Estonian law, the conclusion of the contract for the provision 
of health care services can be alleged at all times if the health-care provider has 
provided health care services (LOA § 759). Thus, if the health-care provider 
performs e.g. the procedure of termination of pregnancy, the existence of the 
contract between the patient and the health-care provider can be alleged.80 As 
the contract for provision of health-care services is generally concluded with the 
patient who receives medical counselling or treatment, the question of who is 
entitled to issue a wrongful conception claim also arises.  
The liability of the health-care provider depends on whether the prerequisites 
of the contractual and/or delictual liability are met. According to Estonian law, 
it is not clear, whether the health-care provider’s basis of liability is contractual 
or delictual or both.  
                                                                          
79  M. Ramsay, Wrongful pregnancy and the offset/benefits approach. – Canadian Journal 
of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. 28/1, 2015, p. 131. It has been found that pregnancy could be 
considered as health damage, if the pregnancy is unwanted. See D. Nolan. New forms of 
damage in negligence. – The Modern Law Review, Vol. 70/1, 2007, pp. 73‒75. 
80  The Estonian Supreme Court has held that the termination of pregnancy is allowed to the 
extent that a woman’s right to free self-realisation, including self-determination, outweighs 
in the meaning of § 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia the unborn child’s right 
to life in the meaning of § 16 of the constitution. Since this is a medical intervention into a 
woman’s bodily integrity, the termination of the pregnancy can be considered as a provision 
of health care. Decision in case no 3-2-1-31-11 of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court 
of 11 May 2011, para. 11. 
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Statement set forth for defence 
Under Estonian law, the health-care provider should be liable under contract 
law and in certain circumstances under the law of delicts in cases of wrongful 
conception. 
 
Reasoning 
Neither Estonian case law nor legal literature have taken a position as to 
whether unwanted pregnancy could be regarded as damage to a woman’s 
health. It has simply been found that the abnormality occurring in the human 
body could be regarded as health damage.81 The present author is of the opinion 
that with the aim of giving the victim a freedom of choice (whether to qualify 
the claim as contractual or delictual), the possibility to regard an unwanted 
pregnancy as bodily injury cannot be excluded. Analogously to the German 
discussion, under Estonian law the consideration of the existence of a foetus as 
damage to the health is not reasoned82, but rather the fact that a person was 
deprived of possibility to decide over one’s body. Though the commentary to 
LOA states that a person’s bodily self-determination is one’s personal right,83 
causing the unwanted pregnancy could as an exception be regarded as both a 
violation of personal right and health damage.  
In U.S. case law, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has stated that the 
injury in the case of wrongful conception lies in the mother’s continued fertility 
given her desire and effort to be sterilised, and that the doctor’s negligence in 
performing the sterilisation operation and failing to inform the mother of the 
unsuccessful outcome constitutes a tort.84  
As the unwanted pregnancy in the cases of wrongful conception is generally 
the consequence of a medical error or misdiagnosis, due to which the procedure 
is unsuccessful (i.e. there is a breach of contract for provision of health care 
services on the health-care provider’s part), the legal basis for the liability of 
health-care providers could primarily be contractual.  
Although the contract for provision of health-care services is generally 
concluded with the patient who receives medical counselling or treatment, the 
effects of the contract should not be limited to the parties only. For example, the 
German Supreme Court has found that the contractual obligation to perform the 
sterilisation procedure protects both parties, even if only one of the parents was 
a party to the contract.85  
Under Estonian law, the question of whether the parent who is not a party to 
the contract is entitled to the compensation for the damages depends foremost 
on whether the health-care provider had to recognise that the contract was also 
                                                                          
81  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 645.  
82  As to whether the unwanted pregnancy can be regarded as bodily injury, see also 
A. Grubb, J. Laing, J. McHale (see Note 54), 298‒301, 5.102; 5.107‒5.109. 
83  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 646.  
84  See e.g. Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991). In the same case 
it was stated that the financial security of the family is a legally protected interest. 
85  BGH, NJW 1995, 2407 ff. 
30 
directed at the protection of the third party’s (the second parent’s) interests and 
rights (LOA § 81 – contract with protective effect for third party); e.g. if the 
patient informs the doctor that they and their partner do not wish to have any 
more children, and conclude the contract, it can seemingly be alleged that the 
health care provider should also have recognised the interests of the patient’s 
partner and the aim of said patient to also protect their partner’s interests. Thus in 
principle both parents can claim damages in the case of wrongful conception. 
According to LOA § 766 (2), as a rule, a health care provider shall not 
promise that a patient will recover or that an operation will be successful. 
However, if the object of the contract for provision of health care services is the 
termination of pregnancy or a pregnancy prevention-oriented procedure, then an 
unsuccessful procedure constitutes as a rule a medical mistake on the part of the 
health care provider. In such a case, it can be alleged that the health care service 
did not conform to the general level of medical science at the time the services 
are provided and the services were not provided with the care which can 
normally be expected of providers of health care services (LOA § 762).86 
The breach of obligation has to be in causal relation to the damage caused to 
the patient. In the cases of wrongful conception, it should be proved at first that 
due to certain reasons (e.g. financial difficulties or a wish to limit the size of the 
family) the parents did not want any more children.87 The health-care provider’s 
fault should also be established through the evaluation of the health-care 
provider’s behaviour.  
Accordingly, establishing the grounds for the health care provider’s 
contractual liability under LOA § 770 (1) or (2) should not be problematic in 
the cases of unwanted pregnancy. As pointed out above (see para 2.2.2.), the 
health-care provider’s contractual liability does not exclude the application of 
liability under the law of delicts. German BGH has also considered possible 
liability on both a contractual and a non-contractual basis in the case of failed 
sterilisation.88  
In the meaning of the law of delicts, it is important to distinguish the health-
care provider’s acts which aimed at preventing the pregnancy. As stated above, 
causing an unwanted pregnancy as a result of unsuccessful procedure of 
                                                                          
86  In the opinion of the Estonian Supreme Court, if the quality of the doctor’s actions is lower 
than that of an educated and experienced specialist in the specific field, this could be a 
medical error. Decision in case no 3-2-1-78-06 of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court 
of 3 October 2006, para 12. According to TPSA § 13 (1), the doctor having established the 
existence and duration of pregnancy shall perform all the examinations and acts cor-
responding to the relevant treatment standard prior to referral for termination of pregnancy. 
The list of examinations and acts prior to and following the termination of pregnancy are 
established by a regulation of the minister responsible for the area. 
87  I. Giesen (see Note 2), p. 265. 
88  BGH decision of 18 March 1980, BGHZ 76, 249. See also H. Oetker, ‘Art und Umfang 
des Schadenersatzes’, in F.J. Säcker and R.Rixecker (eds). Münchener Kommentar. Bürger-
liches Gesetzbuch. Schuldrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. 5.Auflage. München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 
2007, 288–431, at p. 299. 
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termination of pregnancy (i.e. the health-care provider’s active intervention into 
the patient’s body) can in principle be regarded as causing bodily injury to the 
patient, which is unlawful under LOA § 1045 (1) 2. Delictual liability should 
not follow if the patient relies on the fact that the unwanted pregnancy was a 
result of misdiagnosis or insufficient counselling. In case of establishing the 
diagnosis or counselling, the health-care provider does not intervene into the 
patient’s body (in contrast to e.g. the procedure of sterilisation). 
Accordingly, under Estonian law, delictual liability in case of unwanted 
pregnancy could be affirmed foremost under LOA § 1045 (1) subsection 2 if 
alleged that the health-care provider has caused damage to the patient’s health.  
In cases of misdiagnosis, the Estonian Supreme Court has affirmed, in 
principle, the patient’s claim against the health-care provider also on the basis 
of the law of delict.89 However, Estonian courts have not appraised whether 
misdiagnosis constitutes a delict. In the present author’s opinion, failing to 
prevent the pregnancy by insufficient counselling or by failure to diagnose the 
existence of pregnancy cannot constitute an unlawful act in the meaning of the 
law of delict, because there is no protective provision that entails an obligation 
on the part of a health-care provider to prevent the pregnancy or diagnose its 
existence. It is highly doubtful preventing or diagnosing the pregnancy could be 
expected from the health-care provider on the grounds of general duty to 
maintain safety (general rules of behaviour developed by case law, which are 
aimed at ensuring safety90). 
Neither can failure to inform the patient as such be considered unlawful 
according to LOA § 1045. The objective behind the obligation to inform the 
patient is not to prevent harm to the patient’s life or health but rather primarily 
to prevent violation of personality rights.91 
In principle, the health-care provider’s delictual liability could follow from 
breach of the parents’ personality right(s). However, relying on intervention in 
family planning as violation of personal right (LOA § 1045 (1) p 4) should not 
bring about delictual liability according to Estonian law, because in such case 
under LOA § 1044 (2) the existence of contract supersedes the delictual 
liability.  
 
 
                                                                          
89  Decision in case no 3-2-1-171-10 of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of 8 April 
2011, para 18. 
90  I. Nõmm. Käibekohustuse rikkumisel põhinev deliktiõiguslik vastutus (Delictual Liability 
Based on the Breach of the Duty to Maintain Safety). Dissertation. Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus. 
Tartu, 2013. (in Estonian) – Available at: http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/29910/ 
n6mm_iko.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (27.03.2017) 
91  P. Varul et al (see Note 4), p. 293. Violation of personality rights in the meaning of the 
Estonian LOA may lie in e.g. unlawful depriving a person of liberty, defamation, unjustified 
use of the person’s name or image of the person, the breaching the inviolability of the private 
life, right to free self-realisation, etc. P. Varul et al (see Note 43), p. 463–464.  
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5.1.2. The obligation of the health-care provider  
to compensate for damages under contract law and  
under the law of delicts in case of wrongful birth 
Description of the Problem 
Similarly to the cases of wrongful conception, in the cases of wrongful birth the 
existence of a contract for provision of health-care services shall be presumed 
under LOA § 759, if an expectant mother undergoes prenatal testing in order to 
avoid the birth of a disabled child.  
As the contract for provision of health-care services is generally concluded 
with the patient who receives medical counselling or treatment, the question of 
who is entitled to issue a wrongful birth claim also arises similarly to the cases 
of wrongful conception.  
Another question to be answered is which kind of conditions justify the 
issuing of the claim. It should be clear that the health-care provider should not 
be liable for failure to diagnose every disability regardless of its significance.  
J. T. Stein has stated that despite the ethical and moral concerns involved, 
claims of wrongful birth should be permitted. Otherwise, the parents would be 
unjustly left with the heavy burden of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage 
incurred through deprivation of their right to choose due to the health-care 
provider’s negligence.92 The author of this dissertation agrees. 
Thus it is interesting to analyse, whether the liability of the health-care 
provider is possible on the basis of contractual or delictual liability. 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Under Estonian law the health-care provider should be liable under contract law 
in cases of wrongful birth. Delictual liability does not apply due to the absence 
of an unlawful act in the meaning of LOA § 1045. 
 
Reasoning 
In the cases of wrongful birth, the health-care provider’s negligence lies in 
misdiagnosis and the consequent failure to inform the patient that the future 
child may be born disabled. This constitutes a breach of contract for provision 
of health care services on the health-care provider’s part. Thus the health-care 
provider’s liability could primarily be contractual in nature.93 
  
                                                                          
92  For more information about the parents’ right to procreative autonomy, see J. T. Stein. 
Backdoor eugenics: The troubling implications of certain damages awards in wrongful birth 
and wrongful life claims. – Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 40/3, 2010, pp. 1120–1128. 
93  The same has been proposed by Janno Lahe and Tambet Tampuu in B. Winiger et al (see 
Note 1), p. 954. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110248494 
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German law too allows wrongful-birth claims only on a contractual basis.94 
Liability for wrongful birth is also allowable in the U.S.95 
Similarly to the cases of wrongful conception, the question of the person 
entitled to issue the claim arises also in cases of wrongful birth. In the author’s 
opinion, if the patient informs the doctor of said patient’s and their partner’s 
wish to prevent the birth of a disabled child and concludes the contract, it can be 
alleged that the health-care provider should have recognised the interests of the 
patient’s partner and the aim of the patient to protect said partner’s interests. 
Thus, it can be presumed that both parents have a claim for damages under the 
rubric of wrongful birth. 
As the health-care provider’s negligence in the cases of wrongful birth lies 
primarily in misdiagnosis, the central question concerning liability is whether 
the diagnosis corresponded to the general level of medical science and was 
performed according to general duty of care expected from the health care 
provider (LOA § 762). Due to misdiagnosis the health care provider fails to 
warn the parents about the fact that the child might be born disabled and thus 
breaches the obligation to inform the patient.96 The Estonian Supreme Court has 
explained that giving an incorrect diagnosis can be regarded as a breach of 
obligation arising from the contract for provision of health-care services. 
Consequently, the health-care provider must compensate for the damage that 
has evolved as a result of misdiagnosis if a correct diagnosis was possible when 
                                                                          
94  BGH NJW 1997, 1638, 1640; BGH NJW 2002, 886; NJW 2002, 2636, 2637; NJW 2005, 
891, 892. See also BGB § 823, Schadensersatzpflicht (Liability for damages); H.-G. 
Bamberger, H. Roth. Beck’scher Online-Kommentar BGB, 37th ed. 2013, p. 756. Available at 
https://beck-online.beck.de/ (27.03.2017) 
95  Although the majority of US states recognise the wrongful-birth cause of action, several 
states have statutorily barred these claims. J.K. Mason et al (see Note 52), p. 353. In the 
U.S., the wrongful birth cases are generally approached as a type of medical malpractice 
claim. Medical malpractice tort under the U.S. law has the following prerequisites: 1) a duty, 
2) a breach of duty, and 3) an injury 4) proximately caused by the breach. See, for example, 
Keel v. Banach, 624 So.2d 1022 (1993). However, in Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville 
Family Health Center, the breach-of-contract cause of action was recognised with the 
statement that a physician who contracts and charges for a service, such as a prenatal ultra-
sound scan and consequent opinion as to the results of that scan, is liable for any breach of 
contract in this regard. See Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 
120 S.W.3d (2003). 
96  According to LOA § 766 (1) the health-care provider shall inform the patient of the 
results of the examination of the patient and the state of his or her health, any possible ill-
nesses and the development thereof, the availability, nature and purpose of the health care 
services required, the risks and consequences associated with the provision of such health 
care services and of other available health care services. The health-care provider’s obli-
gation to inform the patient has also been recognised in U.S. case law; e.g. in Smith v. Cote, 
the court stated that the relevant standard of obligation for informing the patient does not 
require a physician to identify every possible birth defect without regard to its significance 
(Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231 [1986]). See also Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 
N.W.2d 10, 17 (Minn. 1986); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993). 
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the general level of medical science and the general duty of care at the time are 
taken into account.97  
Aside the evaluation of whether the diagnosis corresponded to the general 
level of medical science, the gravity of the disability shall be taken into 
consideration. It should be clear that a wrongful-birth claim should not be 
allowable in consequence to every birth defect, no matter its significance. When 
the child’s disability is mild or treatable or not related to the child’s health (e.g. 
due to the incorrect selection of embryo the child is of an unwanted race), it is 
much more difficult to argue that the parents have suffered damage.98 The 
question of what conditions are ‘medically relevant’ and could accordingly give 
rise to a wrongful-birth cause of action is complicated.  
In Estonia, the set of ‘medically relevant’ traits that give rise to a wrongful-
birth cause of action should at least include those traits that would justify late-
term abortion under TPSA § 6 (2) subsection 2. The gravity of the child’s 
disability should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with regard to the child’s 
functional limitations and the extent of his or her suffering.99 
In a wrongful-birth case, the plaintiff must, inter alia, prove that the child 
would have been aborted if the plaintiff had been made aware of the foetus’s 
deformities.100 The difficulty of establishing causation has justified dismissal of 
wrongful-birth action in several cases in the U.S.101 Nevertheless, the majority 
of courts both in Germany and in the U.S have affirmed the existence of a claim 
of wrongful birth.  
If the prerequisites stated above for contractual liability are met, the 
health-care provider shall be liable in wrongful-birth cases under the Estonian 
LOA. In every case, the central question is whether the health-care provider has 
breached the contractual obligation.  
                                                                          
97  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-171-10 of 8 April 2011, para 14. 
98  In the case of Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank the complaint was filed against a sperm 
bank alleging that the defendant mistakenly gave the plaintiff vials of sperm from an 
African-American donor even though the plaintiff had requested the sperm of a white donor 
with blond hair and blue eyes. The claim was based on wrongful birth, arguing that the 
child’s ‘wrong’ race should be considered to the equivalent of a disability or birth defect. The 
court dismissed the claim. A. Bernabe analysed the issue of using race as an element in a tort 
law claim and concluded that recognizing race, as a disability for which the law provides a 
remedy, is wrong as a matter of public policy. See more at A. Bernabe. Do Black Lives Matter? 
Race as a Measure of Injury in Tort Law. – 18 Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review & Social 
Justice 41 (2016). 
99  See also W. F. Hensel. The disabling impact of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions. – 
Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 40/1, 2005, pp. 181–190; P. L. Barber 
(see Note 57), pp. 347–350. 
100  Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); McKenney v. Jersey City Medical Center, 
771 A.2d 1153 (2001).  
101  E.g., Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (1988). Ivo Giesen finds it doubtful that the parents 
could prove that, had they known about the child’s disability, they would have decided to 
terminate the pregnancy. See I. Giesen (see Note 2), pp. 257–273. 
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In principle, the patient could also issue a claim on the grounds of delictual 
liability. However, in the author’s opinion, failing to diagnose a child’s 
disability cannot constitute an unlawful act in the meaning of the law of delict, 
because there is no protective provision that entails an obligation on the part of 
a health-care provider to diagnose a child’s disability.  
As the health-care provider’s breach of obligation is not the cause of the 
child’s disability, it is also not possible to rely exclusively on LOA § 1045 (1) 2, 
according to which the infliction of damage is unlawful if the damage stems 
from the causing of bodily injury or damage to the health of the victim. In 
addition, the Estonian Supreme Court has stated that, according to § 130 (1) of 
LOA, only the aggrieved person (and no other person) can claim damages 
arising from health damage or bodily injury.102 Therefore, the parents cannot 
rely on LOA § 1045 (1) subsection 2 when stating that they have suffered 
damage due to their child’s health condition. 
In principle, the health-care provider’s delictual liability could follow from 
breach of the parents’ personality right(s). Relying on intervention in family 
planning as violation of personality rights (see LOA § 1045 (1) subsection 4) 
should not bring about delictual liability under Estonian law, because in such a 
case the existence of a contract supersedes the delictual liability.103  
Thus, the author concludes that the health-care provider’s delictual liability 
does not follow in cases of wrongful birth. 
 
 
5.1.3. The obligation of the health-care provider  
to compensate for damages under contract law and  
under the law of delicts in case of wrongful life 
Description of the Problem 
Among the cases of prenatal damages, probably the most complex problems 
concerning health-care provider’s liability arise in the cases of wrongful life. 
B.A. Koch has concluded that in Europe the courts do not generally satisfy such 
claims. The foetus does not have the right to decide that an abortion be 
undertaken, because it concerns his/her mother’s right of self-determination, not 
that of the foetus. Also, there is no ‘right not to be born’.104 In the U.S. case law 
it has been mostly concluded that there is no rational way to measure non-
                                                                          
102  The Supreme Court’s decision 3-2-1-174-10 of 9 March 2011, para. 12. 
103  Besides intervention in family planning, the birth of a disabled child could, in principle, 
entail breach of other personality rights of the parents, as in spousal loss of consortium. In 
case of wrongful birth, this kind of damage (loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal 
fellowship suffered by the marital unit) can be alleged as a result of the shock of not being 
adequately informed and prepared for the birth of the disabled child. D.W. Whitney, K.N. 
Rosenbaum have concluded that damages for loss of consortium may be recoverable in a 
wrongful birth case even if damages for emotional distress are also awarded to both parents. 
D.W. Whitney, K.N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), p. 196. 
104  B. Winiger et al (eds.) (see Note 1), pp. 958–960.  
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existence.105 Thus, the wrongful life claims are generally unsuccessful both in 
the U.S. and in European courts.  
The cases of wrongful life entail the non-existence paradox: without the 
health-care provider’s negligence the child would not have been born at all. 
Thus, the comparison is made between being born with a disability and not 
being born at all.  
The opponents of compensation for the damage in the cases of wrongful life 
find that compensation for the damage means ascribing to the view that it would 
have been better had the child not been born at all. The proponents emphasise 
the importance of compensation for the child and supporting the value of the 
child through compensation.106 Still, in solving the claim under the rubric of 
wrongful life, the existence of cognisable damage is the central question.  
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Under Estonian law, the health-care provider should not be liable under contract 
law or under the law of delicts in cases of wrongful life. 
 
Reasoning 
According to LOA § 127 (1), the purpose of compensation for damage is to 
place the aggrieved person in a situation as near as possible to that in which the 
person would have been if the circumstances which are the basis for the 
compensation obligation had not occurred. Thus, in case of wrongful life, the 
states of being born disabled and not being born at all should be compared, 
which creates the situation of the non-existence paradox.  
The health-care provider’s contractual liability in case of wrongful life 
depends on whether the health care provider owes a duty to the child under a 
contract for provision of health-care services. In the U.S., a legal duty to a child 
not yet conceived but foreseeably harmed by the negligent delivery of health-
care services to the child’s parents has been affirmed.107 On the contrary, under 
German law, the contract for provision of health-care services concluded by a 
mother does not prevent the child from living with a disability if this disability 
could have been prevented only via termination of pregnancy.108  
Theoretically, under Estonian law, the contract between the child’s mother 
and the health care provider could be regarded as a contract with protective 
effect for a third party in the meaning of LOA § 81. Affirming this possibility 
according to Estonian law would mean that the child would be able to rely on 
breach of obligation by the health-care provider. However, in the present 
                                                                          
105  E.g. Becker v. Schwartz 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).  
106  B. C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 152 
107  R. Perry. It’s a wonderful life. – Cornell Law Review 93 (2007) /2 (Nov.), p. 392.  
108  P. Gottwald. Vertrag zugunsten Dritter. – F.J. Säcker, R. Rixecker (eds). Münchener Kom-
mentar zum Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Schuldrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. 7. Auflage (Munich Com-
mentary to German Civil Code. Law of Obligations. General part. 7th Edition). Munich: 
Verlag C. H. Beck, Published online 2016, Rn. 208. – Available at https://beck-online.beck.de/ 
(27.03.2017) 
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author’s opinion, it is doubtful whether the child’s interests are linked to the 
contract with the same intensity as are the interests of the parents. 
Regarding the health-care provider’s delictual liability, the standpoint should 
be taken of whether the misdiagnosis by the health-care provider constitutes a 
delict. The main question is whether there is a cognisable interest of the child 
that has been harmed by the health-care provider. It should be borne in mind 
that in cases of wrongful life, the child’s disability is not caused by the health-
care provider, but the health-care provider’s negligence lies in misdiagnosis. 
Thus, the health-care provider’s act is not unlawful on the grounds of causing 
bodily injury or damage to the health of the child (LOA § 1045 (1) subsection 2). 
Also, there is no harm to the child’s personality right (LOA, § 1045 (1) subsection 
4) or violation of duty arising from the law (LOA, § 1045 (1) subsection 7). 
Though TPSA § 6 (2) subsection 2 allows abortion on account of risk of 
disability, it does not entail a duty to the parent and cannot constitute a duty to 
the health-care provider.  
For example, German courts deny the claim in the cases of wrongful life, 
stating that in these cases it is impossible to collate the situations before and 
after causing the damage. BGH has noted that the claimant does not have a 
claim either on the basis of the law of delict or on the basis of contract law. 
There is no delictual obligation to prevent the birth of a disabled child; 
moreover, the birth of a child does not violate the legal interests enacted in BGB 
§ 823 (1). An obligation arising from the contract between the defendant and 
the claimant’s mother to prevent the birth of the claimant does not have a 
protective effect towards the claimant.109  
U.S. jurisdictions which allow the claims of wrongful life the courts set 
aside the philosophical problems that these cases contain and instead prioritise 
the medical needs of a disabled child. Allowing the claims is also explained by 
general endeavour to prevent negligent provision of health-care services.110  
According to Estonian law, if the health-care provider has not caused the 
disability, it cannot be stated that health-care provider has violated the 
claimant’s interests. Similarly, the health care provider is under no obligation 
under the law or duty to maintain safety such to prevent the birth of a disabled 
child. 
In the present author’s opinion, the non-existence paradox cannot be 
overcome by existing legislation. Thus, in the cases of wrongful life the health-
care provider should not be liable and should not bear the consequences of the 
birth of a disabled child. 
 
 
                                                                          
109  BGH decision of 18 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 240.  
110  K. Wevers (see Note 69), p. 266. It has also been found that in cases of wrongful life the 
health-care provider’s delictual liability should apply because the birth of a disabled child as a 
delict corresponds to the traditional meaning of negligence. W. F. Hensel (see Note 99), p. 143. 
38 
5.2. Scope of compensation for damages in cases  
of wrongful conception 
Description of the Problem 
In the cases of wrongful conception, the damages entail the consequences of the 
unwanted pregnancy and the birth of an unplanned but healthy child.  
In case of the mother there could be loss of income, the costs of medical 
expenses and non-pecuniary damage. The damage to both parents could lie in 
child-rearing costs, additional expenses due to certain circumstances (e.g. 
child’s condition); they could also suffer non-pecuniary damage relating to 
unwanted parenting and intervention in family planning.111  
In Estonia, the recoverable damage in cases of wrongful conception should 
be established on the basis of the relevant provisions of LOA (see above para 
2.2.2).  
In the case of damages arising from the unwanted pregnancy, in addition to 
the specific basis of compensation of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, it 
should be evaluated according to LOA § 127 (2) whether the aim of the 
breached obligation or provision was to prevent damage like that which 
occurred in the case in question. In case of the claim arising from a breach of 
contract, foreseeability of damage should be taken into consideration (LOA 
§ 127 (3)). Actually, the provisions mentioned leave the court a great deal of 
discretion in deciding which kind of damage is recoverable in case of an 
unwanted pregnancy, i.e. which kind of damage compensation is equitable.  
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Under Estonian law, LOA § 127 (2) and (3) give the court much discretion in 
deciding which kind of damage is recoverable in case of an unwanted 
pregnancy. The medical expenses and loss of income shall be compensated in 
the cases of wrongful conception, as well as the costs of a new procedure, 
which is aimed at accomplishing the purpose of the failed procedure. Under 
LOA § 134 (2) non-pecuniary damage shall be compensated if the unwanted 
pregnancy is regarded as health damage. In addition, non-pecuniary damage 
shall be awarded in case of intervention into family planning as a breach of 
personal right. 
 
Reasoning 
The corresponding European case law has been summarised by assessment that 
in Europe the damage arising from carrying an unplanned baby and childbirth 
would be compensated with a high probability, but there is a lower probability 
that the child’s maintenance costs and other costs concerning fulfilling parental 
                                                                          
111  B. Winiger et al (see Note 1), p. 901.  
39 
obligations would be compensated.112 In this dissertation, the question of 
compensating the child’s maintenance costs is analysed separately (see para 5.4).  
In U.S. case law it has been stated that the medical expenses incurred by the 
parents as a result of the pregnancy are compensated as pecuniary damage. Any 
additional damages would tend to be extremely speculative in nature, and 
awarding such damages could have a significant impact on the stability of the 
family unit and the child in question. The recoverable non-pecuniary damage 
may lie in the physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish of the mother 
arising from her pregnancy, and the loss to the husband of the comfort, 
companionship, services, and consortium of the wife during her pregnancy and 
immediately after the birth.113  
In Germany, pecuniary damage (e.g. loss of profit and related financial 
damages) is also compensated. In addition, non-pecuniary damage is com-
pensated to the mother; German law provides compensation for such a loss on 
the grounds that she suffered physical injury (Körperverletzung), which relates 
to the pregnancy and delivery of the child.114 
LOA § 130 (1) enacts the compensation for damage in case of health 
damage or bodily injury. Hence, if regarding unwanted pregnancy as health 
damage, LOA § 130 (1) enables the mother to easily claim both medical 
expenses and damage consequent to decrease in income. These are the damages 
that directly result from the unsuccessful procedure of preventing or terminating 
the pregnancy and carrying the unwanted child.  
In Estonian case law, the costs of an unsuccessful procedure have been 
compensated as pecuniary damage.115 However, it is questionable to regard the 
costs of the initial procedure as the patient’s damage because these costs did not 
arise from failure of the procedure. Rather, the costs of a new procedure (which 
is aimed at accomplishing the purpose of the failed procedure) could be 
considered as recoverable damage.  
In addition to pecuniary damage, the compensation of non-pecuniary 
damage could also be possible under the Estonian LOA in cases of wrongful 
                                                                          
112  B. Winiger et al (see Note 1), p. 902. About the recoverability of the child’s maintenance 
costs in European countries see also U. Magnus. Unification of Tort Law: Damages. The 
Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001. 
113  Boone v. Mullendore, No. 80–423, 416 So. 2d 718 (1982). Similar types of damages were 
compensated in Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority v. Graves, where the Supreme Court of 
Georgia stated that the cost of raising a child could not be recovered. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital 
Authority v. Graves, No. 40588, 314 S. E. 2d 653 (1984), see also Jackson v. Bumgardner, No. 
670A84, 318 N.C. 172; 347 S. E. 2d 743 (1986). In Girdley v. Coats, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri explained that wrongful conception gives rise to compensatory damages that are 
measurable. Girdley v. Coats, No. 74029, 825 S. W. 2d 295 (1992). 
114  BGH decision of 27 June 1995, NJW 1995, 2407; BGH decision of 25 June 1985, NJW 
1985, 2749. See also C. van Dam. European Tort Law. Oxford University Press Inc., New York 
2006, p. 159. 
115  Decision in case no 2-09-15036 of 15 February 2010 of Harju County Court. Court de-
cisions of Estonian courts of first instance and courts of appeal are available at  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/kohtulahendid/koik_menetlused.html (in Estonian). 
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conception. If the unwanted pregnancy is regarded as health damage, LOA 
§ 134 (2) should be applied, which states that in the case of causing bodily 
injuries or damage to the health of a person or violation of other personal rights, 
the aggrieved person shall be paid a reasonable amount of money as com-
pensation for non-pecuniary damage. The aforesaid means that non-pecuniary 
damage accompanies health damage automatically.  
As it has been repeatedly noted, the Estonian courts have not stated which 
kind of legal right is violated in case of unwanted pregnancy. If the court finds 
that intervention into family planning or unwanted pregnancy is a breach of 
personal right, non-pecuniary damage could be claimed under LOA § 134 (2).116  
It should be noted that if the claim for non-pecuniary damages is issued on 
the basis of the breach of contract, the damage may only be claimed if the 
purpose of the contractual obligation was to pursue a non-pecuniary interest and 
the obligor was aware or should have been aware that non-performance could 
cause non-pecuniary damage (LOA § 134 (1)). 
It could be alleged that the obligation to perform the procedures of 
termination or prevention of pregnancy is primarily addressed at pursuing non-
pecuniary interest; however, at the same time material interest can follow.  
 
 
5.3. Scope of compensation for damages  
in cases of wrongful birth 
Description of the Problem 
In the cases of wrongful birth, the types of damages that arise are in principle 
similar to those in the cases of wrongful conception. Additional damages lie in 
the expenses due to the child’s disability.  
The birth of a disabled child may cause both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damage. Pecuniary damage may include medical expenses associated with 
pregnancy and delivery, unexpected maintenance costs due to the child’s 
disability (i.e., costs associated with the infant’s and adult’s case-specific care 
and treatment requirements), and loss of income. Non-pecuniary loss may lie in 
the pain caused to the mother in the course of pregnancy and birth, the 
interference with one’s family planning, and the mental suffering due to having 
to care for a disabled child.117 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Under Estonian law, LOA § 127 (2) and (3) give the court broad discretion in 
deciding which kind of damage is recoverable in case of birth of a disabled 
child. The medical expenses associated with pregnancy and delivery, loss of 
income during pregnancy and after the birth of a disabled child that arises from 
                                                                          
116  In several European countries the damages associated with intervention in family 
planning is compensated. See more in B. Winiger et al (eds.) (see Note 1), p. 903. 
117  B. C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 128.  
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the need to take care of the child shall be compensated in the cases of wrongful 
birth, as well as the costs of a new procedure, which is aimed at accomplishing 
the purpose of the failed procedure. The question of compensation of the child’s 
maintenance costs is analysed in para 5.4. The non-pecuniary damage to the 
mother arising from the pain and inconvenience suffered during pregnancy and 
childbirth, interference with family planning – primarily under the LOA 
§ 134 (1) – and witnessing the child’s suffering and consequent death could be 
also subject to compensation. 
 
Reasoning 
Courts in the U.S. and Germany have not taken a uniform stance as to what 
kinds of damages should be awarded in cases of wrongful birth if the claim as 
such is allowed. As regards the non-pecuniary damages, in German law the 
mother can recover non-pecuniary damages for pain and suffering attendant on 
childbirth only if that pain and suffering ‘exceeds the inflictions which 
accompany a birth without complications’.118 Those U.S. courts that refuse to 
allow the recovery of emotional distress damages have typically relied on the 
assertion that emotional trauma has not been accompanied by physical injury or 
that the recovery of such damages is too speculative.119 It has been pointed out 
that damages for parents’ loss of the child’s services and companionship are not 
recoverable, and neither are damages for maternal pain and suffering due to 
childbirth.120  
In the present author’s opinion, a contract for provision of health-care 
services that is aimed at detecting potential birth defects protects both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary interests.  
Under LOA § 130 (1), compensating for the pecuniary damage associated 
with the patient’s own health should apparently not be problematic. In the case 
of misdiagnosis and consequent breach of the obligation to inform the patient, 
the cost of unsuccessful procedures could be compensated for.121 Hence, the 
expenses for the unsuccessful prenatal testing should be compensated for, as 
should the medical expenses associated with pregnancy and delivery. Loss of 
income during pregnancy and after the birth of a disabled child that arises from 
the need to take care of the child could also be subject to compensation. 
As the purpose of the health-care provider’s contractual obligation in these 
cases is also to pursue a non-pecuniary interest, therefore, under the LOA’s 
§ 134 (2), claiming non-pecuniary damage due to the breach of personality 
rights is also possible. However, issuing the claim for non-pecuniary damages 
                                                                          
118  BGH decision of 18 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 240 = NJW 1983, 1371 = JZ 1983, 447; 
N. M. Priaulx (see Note 13), p. 349. 
119  D.W. Whitney, K.N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), p. 191. 
120  D.W. Whitney, K.N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), p. 195. 
121  Such a standpoint has already been adopted in Estonian case law in cases of medical 
error. See the decision in case no. 2-09-15036, of 15 February 2010, of Harju County Court. 
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on grounds of breach of contractual obligation is considerably limited according 
to Estonian case law.122  
With regard to interference with the parents’ personality rights, the success 
of a claim for non-pecuniary damages in Estonia depends on whether deciding 
to terminate the pregnancy, if there is a possibility of the child’s disability, 
according to TPSA § 6 (2) subsection 2, should be affirmed as a person’s right 
of self-determination.123 Regarding the right to family planning or procreation 
as a personality right presumes alleging that the possibility of aborting the 
pregnancy within the 12th–22nd week if the unborn child may suffer severe 
mental or physical harm to its health124 is aimed at protecting the above-
mentioned interests. In the present author’s opinion, deciding to terminate the 
pregnancy if there is a possibility of the child being born with a disability 
should be affirmed as a personal right of self-determination. Consequently, 
there should be compensation for the non-pecuniary damage arising from the 
interference with family planning. 
The Estonian Supreme Court has generally allowed compensation for non-
pecuniary damage arising from physical and mental pain and suffering due to 
misdiagnosis or medical error by the health-care provider.125 Compensation for 
non-pecuniary damage due to disappointment and frustration arising from the 
situation of unexpectedly becoming a parent of a disabled child, however, 
would be highly debatable in Estonian courts.  
However, there are other grounds for non-pecuniary damage-compensation 
claims, that are not based on the parents’ disappointment with having to raise a 
disabled child. According to J.T. Stein, compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage is possible on the grounds that the parents have to watch their child die. 
This is the case if the genetic disease suffered by the child causes him or her to 
die at a very young age and the parents suffer emotional distress as witnesses to 
this.126 LOA § 134 (3) stipulates that in the case of an obligation to compensate 
for damage arising from the death of a person or serious bodily injury or health 
damage caused to that person, the persons closest to the deceased or the 
aggrieved person may also claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage if 
payment of such compensation is justified by exceptional circumstances.  
The condition of exceptional circumstances in the sense of LOA § 134 (3) is 
not met merely by the abstract fact of death and consequent grief and loss. The 
Estonian Supreme Court has explained that these exceptional circumstances are 
                                                                          
122  Decision in case no. 3-2-1-71-14 of the Supreme Court en banc of 15 December 2015, 
para. 131. 
123  Awarding compensation for interference with reproductive autonomy presupposes that 
the latter is classified as an interest protected by the legal order. B.C. Steininger (see Note 2), 
p. 150. 
124  See TPSA Section 6 (2) 2. For example, the U.S. courts have held that deciding to termi-
nate the pregnancy falls within the mother’s right of self-determination (Canesi v. Wilson, 
730 A.2d 805 [1999]). 
125  The Supreme Court’s decision in case no 3-2-1-171-10 of 8 April 2011, para 15.  
126  J.T. Stein (see Note 92), p. 1161. 
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affirmed in the event of the plaintiff’s spatial proximity to the deceased or 
severely injured person at the time of or after the accident.127 Compensation 
under § 134 (3) would, therefore, be justified only if the parents were to witness 
the child’s death (i.e., be in spatial proximity during it) or, for example, 
experience emotional distress as a result of seeing their child suffer. 
However, awarding pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages is not 
automatically justifiable in full. The Estonian LOA stipulates several possible 
limits to the compensation and the extent of the damages.  
 
 
5.4. Scope of compensation of the child’s maintenance 
costs in cases of wrongful conception and wrongful birth  
Description of the Problem 
It could be alleged that the main object of discussion in the cases of prenatal 
damages has been foremost the question of whether the child’s maintenance 
costs are subject to compensation. It should not be surprising that Estonian law 
also does not enact expressis verbis whether the child’s maintenance costs are 
recoverable damage.  
In case of wrongful conception, without the health care provider’s neg-
ligence the child’s upbringing expenses would not have arisen. As pointed out 
above (see para. 2.2.3.2.), in contrast to the cases of wrongful conception, in the 
case of unexpected birth of a disabled child (i.e. wrongful birth), the birth of a 
(healthy) child was actually sought. Thus, in the cases of wrongful birth there 
could be a presumption that the parents were ready to bear at least the 
maintenance costs of the expected healthy child and, hence, that only 
non-recoverability of the extra costs associated with disability could harm the 
interests of the parents.128 However, this approach does not take into account the 
possibility that the parents, had they been informed in a timely manner of the 
child’s disability, might not have decided to keep the child and so would not 
have had to bear the child’s maintenance costs at all.129 It could therefore be 
alleged, according to the conditio sine qua non rule, that were it not for the 
health-care provider’s negligence, the child in question would not have been 
born at all and the parents would have avoided the expenses attendant to the 
birth of a child.  
                                                                          
127  The Supreme Court’s decision 3-2-1-19-08 of 9 April 2008, paras 16–17. 
128  W.T. Nuninga. Wrongful testing and its lively consequences. – European Journal of Law 
Reform 16 (2014), pp. 181–206, on p. 204. Nevertheless, as shown above, the parents’ 
readiness to bear the maintenance costs of an expected healthy child have not precluded the 
German courts from awarding the parents damages for the full amount of the child’s 
maintenance costs (i.e., not only the extra costs associated with disability). 
129  B. Winiger et al (see Note 1), p. 960. The compensation for depriving the parents of the 
possibility to choose is similar to compensation under the principle of loss of chance. For 
discussion of compensation for lost chance in various European countries, see B. Winiger et 
al (see Note 69), pp. 545–592. 
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Nevertheless, there are several contra-arguments opposing the application of 
merely the conditio sine qua non rule. M. Hogg has noted that despite the 
existence of a causal link, the creation of the parent’s maintenance obligation as 
a result of the third party’s negligence is not sufficient for transition of 
maintenance obligation as a fundamental value to the third party.130 
In several cases the opponents to the compensation of the maintenance costs 
have relied on the argument that if the child’s maintenance costs are 
compensated, this is asserting that the child (or their birth) is the harmful event, 
which is not seen an ethical stance. This leads to a negative value judgement 
being attached to the child and would inflict psychological damage on the child 
should he learn about the parents’ claim against the health care provider. 
Another argument contra awarding the child’s maintenance costs is the 
attachment of a negative value judgement to the child and infliction of psycho-
logical harm on the child if he or she learns about the parents’ claim against the 
health-care provider. At the same time it should be taken into account that 
satisfying the child’s maintenance costs claim could be in the interests of the 
child himself and the whole family.131 
The author agrees with H. Koziol’s opinion that after all, the main question 
of the corresponding dispute is not whether the child can be regarded as 
damage, but whether the child’s maintenance costs should be compensated.132 
B. C. Steininger too finds that the damage does not lie in having a child as such, 
but in the obligation to bear his upbringing expenses.133 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Under Estonian law, the child’s maintenance costs shall not be compensated in 
cases of wrongful conception. In cases of wrongful birth, the child’s main-
tenance costs shall be compensated in full.  
 
Reasoning 
Recovery of the maintenance costs of a healthy child has been variously 
addressed in German case law. Bundesgerichtshof has stated that the birth of a 
child and their maintenance should be kept separate. The latter is a recoverable 
damage.134 This standpoint has been criticised by the second Senat of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVerfG) which 
considered compensation for costs of maintenance to be contrary to the dignity 
of the child and thus a violation of article 1 § 1 Grundgesetz (Basic Law).135 
                                                                          
130 M. Hogg. Damages for Pecuniary Loss in Cases of Wrongful Birth. – Journal of Euro-
pean Tort Law, Vol. 1/2, 2010, p. 161. 
131  B.C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 129‒130. 
132  H. Koziol. Basic Questions of Tort Law from Germanic Perspective. Jan Sramek Verlag, 
2012, pp. 125‒126. 
133  B.C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 133. 
134  BGH decision of 18 March 1980, BGHZ 76, 249.  
135  BVerfG decision of 28 May 1993, NJW 1993, 1751; BVerfG (Zweiter Senat) decision of 
22 October 1997, NJW 1998, 523; JZ 1998, 356.  
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However, the standpoint of Bundesgerichtshof was supported by BVerfG’s first 
Senat, given that the contract for provision of health-care services is lawful. The 
contract would not be lawful, e.g., if the termination of pregnancy was against 
the law.136 Summarising the corresponding German case law, C. van Dam has 
noted that although Bundesgerichtshof principally acknowledged the right to 
compensation for costs of maintenance, the position of the second Senat 
indicates that it requires serious and thorough discussion.137 According to BGH 
case law, only the average costs of the child’s maintenance could be awarded, 
but not the expenses of the specific child, or full expenses. BGH has stated that 
the family’s social or economic position should not be taken into account when 
deciding compensation.138  
In the U.S., the case law regarding the recoverable damage differs from state 
to state. The courts of some states have found that the blessing of having a child 
cannot be regarded as damaging the parents.139 In two states the child-rearing 
expenses are also compensated.140  
According to H. Koziol, the answer to the question of whether the child’s 
maintenance costs should be compensated depends on whether the approach is 
taken from the perspective of family law or the law of compensation of 
damages. The first is based on the logic that all the consequences associated 
with the birth of the child are in whole governed by family law, with which the 
law of compensation of damages cannot interfere.141 H. Koziol and B.C. 
Steininger are both of the opinion that the tortfeasor in a case involving 
unwanted pregnancy does not only cause the maintenance obligation, but also a 
comprehensive family law relationship whereby the material and non-material 
elements are inextricably intertwined.142 
In short, the answer to the question requires a value judgement on the part of 
the court. However, even if the court finds that the right to damages in this case 
falls back from family law, it is not a convincing argument against compen-
sating maintenance costs. Although the tortfeasor has caused a comprehensive 
family law relationship, the obligation to give maintenance to the child does not 
                                                                          
136  BVerfG decision of 12 November 1997, BVerfGE 96, 375; NJW 1998, 519; JZ 1998, 352. 
137  C. van Dam (see Note 114), p. 157. 
138  BGH decision of 4 March 1997, NJW 1997, 1638 and BGH decision of 25 February 
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139  Public Health Trust v Brown 388 So. 2d 1084 (1980); Sutkin v Beck 629 SW 2d 131 (1982). 
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141  H. Koziol (see Note 132), p. 125‒126. 
142  H. Koziol (see Note 132), p. 130; B.C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 133. 
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disappear. Moreover, the court needs more specific arguments to reason the 
decision.  
While according to the general approach only the same type of benefit can 
be taken into account, it has been placed in doubt by H. Koziol in the context of 
these cases, because it does not enable the evaluation of the event as whole.143 It 
might therefore be concluded that in denying recovery of child maintenance 
costs the court is required to make a value judgment, which is based on the fact 
that as a special case the non-material benefit obtained from child rearing 
negates the child’s upbringing expenses. Moreover, LOA § 127 (5) does not 
stipulate that only the same type of benefits should necessarily be taken into 
account.144 
As an additional argument, it is possible to rely on LOA § 127 (2) and allege 
that the prevention of the child’s maintenance costs was not the purpose of the 
obligation to perform the procedure of terminate or prevention of pregnancy. 
This argument is more easily applied if there was a therapeutic indication for 
the contraception or termination of pregnancy. On the other hand, if the aim of 
prevention or termination of pregnancy was the family’s poor economic 
condition, due to which the parents wish to limit the number of dependents, the 
question of foreseeability of the expenses related to the child’s upbringing 
should not be problematic.  
In the author’s opinion, the maintenance costs of a healthy child shall not be 
compensated. With regard to expenses related to the upbringing of the child in 
wrongful conception cases, it is not easy to justify (at least among the 
provisions governing compensation) why the child’s maintenance costs should 
be left uncompensated by the health-care provider. However, in the author’s 
opinion, compensation of the child’s maintenance costs is contrary to the 
principle of reasonableness and ratio legis of the right to compensation. Karin 
Sein has also referred to the claim maintenance costs of the unwanted child as 
damage that the Estonian courts would probably not satisfy, because the 
question of compensating such damage is ethically very problematic.145 
As regards the cases of wrongful birth, the disabled child’s maintenance 
costs may be compensated in full in Germany. The health-care provider is 
responsible not only for the additional expenses connected to the child’s 
disability, but also for the child’s maintenance costs in full. Hence, maintenance 
costs are awarded irrespective of the state of the child.146 The Federal Court of 
Justice of Germany has stated that the health-care provider who advises a 
woman about the possibility of amniocentesis and dangers to the child is held 
                                                                          
143  H. Koziol (see Note 132), p. 129, 130. 
144  See para. 5.5. 
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146  BGHZ 89, 95, 105; BGHZ 124, 128, 145. See also N. M. Priaulx (see Note 13), p. 349. 
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liable for the subsequent maintenance costs if, for reason of lack of information, 
that woman gives birth to a disabled child.147  
In contrast to the German case law, in the U.S. claims by the parents for re-
covery of ordinary child-raising costs are rarely successful.148 Most jurisdictions 
in the U.S. accept the recovery of extraordinary expenses, including hospital 
and medical costs that are necessary for treating the birth defect, along with 
additional medical or educational costs attributable to the birth defect. However, 
the lifetime expense of caring for a disabled individual depends on the birth 
defect and its development, thereby making preparation of a lifetime care plan 
both complex and challenging.149  
According to the Estonian Family Law Act (FLA)150 § 97 subsection 3, a 
descendant or ascendant who needs assistance and is unable to maintain him- or 
herself is also entitled to receive maintenance. In the author’s opinion, the 
possible negative value judgement concurrent with the compensation for 
maintenance costs is outweighed by the benefits to the child. Awarding damages 
to the parents would only help them provide the necessary care to their child; 
hence, it would be favourable for the disabled child. 
In principle, therefore, the disabled child’s maintenance costs (i.e., both the 
expected costs of raising a healthy child and the additional expenses due to 
disability) could be compensated for under the Estonian LOA. The question of 
the limits to the compensation for damage is analysed below.  
 
 
5.5. Offsetting the benefits of birth and  
maintenance of a child in the cases of wrongful  
conception and wrongful birth 
Description of the Problem 
Clearly, in the cases of unwanted pregnancy the parents may gain material and 
immaterial benefits. The question is how this can be taken into consideration in 
compensating the pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage. Estonian LOA § 127 (5) 
constitutes that any gain received by the injured party as a result of the damage 
caused, particularly the costs avoided by the injured party, shall be deducted 
from the compensation for the damage unless deduction is contrary to the 
purpose of the compensation. 
C. van Dam has successfully summarised that the main objection to the 
benefit offset in cases of wrongful conception is that the costs are material 
                                                                          
147  BGHZ 89, 95 2923; NJW 1997, pp. 1638, 1640. Amniocentesis is a medical procedure 
that is regarded as the ‘gold standard’ in prenatal testing, with accuracy approaching 100%. 
It is performed through the maternal abdomen. See also D. W. Whitney, K. N. Rosenbaum 
(see Note 57), p. 168. 
148  D.W. Whitney, K.N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), p. 176. 
149  D.W. Whitney, K.N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), p. 174. 
150  Family Law Act. State Gazette I 2009, 60, 395. 
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whereas the joy is immaterial. This is an argument to only offsetting the non-
pecuniary loss by the value of the benefits.151 
According to the general approach, only damage of the same type can be 
taken into account, i.e. material benefit cannot be deducted from non-pecuniary 
damage; likewise, non-pecuniary damage cannot be deducted from pecuniary 
damage.152 For example, in Germany it has been found that in establishing the 
amount of pecuniary damages it is not possible to take into account the 
accompanying non-material benefit.153  
 
Statement set forth for defence 
The benefits of birth and maintenance of a child shall be taken into account in 
the cases of birth of an unplanned healthy child. The birth of a disabled child shall 
not bring about the benefits that could be offset according to LOA § 127 (5).  
 
Reasoning 
Benefit offset has been applied in German case law. However, it has been 
emphasised that offset is only possible with respect to damages of the same 
kind: because the ‘benefit’ of raising a child is non-pecuniary, primarily off-
setting of non-pecuniary damage could be discussed.154  
The U.S. courts have also applied the benefit offset principle.155 However, 
according to U.S. case law, the application of the benefit rule depends on the 
reasons for which the parents decided to avoid the pregnancy. If they wanted to 
avoid having any more children (and by this, the benefit of another child), it 
would be unjust to apply the benefit rule.156 According to K. C. Vikingstad, in 
the U.S. the courts have misused the benefit rule in wrongful parentage cases 
either by using a severely modified form of the rule or improperly allowing 
benefits to be used to reduce or eliminate actual damages, rather than 
                                                                          
151  C. van Dam (see Note 114), p. 158. 
152  H. Koziol (see Note 132), p. 129. 
153  B.C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 137. About the child-birth as non-material benefit deduction 
see also N. M. Priaulx. Health, Disability & Parental Interests: Adopting a Contextual Approach 
in Reproductive Torts. – European Journal of Health Law, Vol. 12/3, 2005, p. 218. 
154  B.C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 137. On receiving a child as a non-pecuniary benefit, see 
also N. M. Priaulx (see Note 153), p. 218. It should be noted that, in principle, the child’s 
possible obligation to support his or her parents in future (see the FLA § 96–97) could be 
regarded as a pecuniary benefit against which some of the damages could be offset. However, 
in the case of a disabled child, the child’s own obligation to provide support is questionable, 
when that child’s health condition is taken into account.  
155  E.g. in the case of Burke v. Rivo The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that 
any benefits conferred on the parents as a result of the birth of the child should be offset 
from the compensation. Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d I (Mass. 1990). 
156  E.g. the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that it was not equitable to apply the benefit 
rule because it was precisely to avoid the benefit of another child that the plaintiffs sought 
out the defendant in the first place. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis.2d 59; 450 N.W.2d 243 
(1989). 
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considering, as the rule intends, benefits in assessing the extent of actual damages 
to an interest.157 M. Ramsay argues that the alleged benefits of unplanned healthy 
children are irrelevant to the tortfeasor-victim relationship and these benefits 
should not block or reduce victims’ claims to child-rearing damages.158 
The author is of the opinion that the benefit offset argument is sufficiently 
convincing to justify not compensating the non-pecuniary damage which relates 
to unwilling parenthood or intervention in family planning. It could be alleged 
that the damage inflicted by intervention in family planning conflates into joy 
and non-material value, which is offered by the upbringing of the child.  
Another question is whether this joy is able to ‘neutralise’ also the physical 
pain and discomfort associated with pregnancy and childbirth. The author finds 
that the joy cannot ‘neutralise’ the physical effect to the full extent. Therefore, 
the child’s mother could be entitled to a reasonable (if not to say symbolic) 
amount of compensation for her physical suffering. 
What kind of material benefit could accompany the birth of an unwanted 
child? First and foremost, the potential material benefit accompanying the birth 
of an unwanted child is the child’s possible obligation to support his parents in 
future (FLA § 96‒97). However, at the time of compensation it is not known in 
advance whether the child will have such an obligation. Therefore, it is very 
questionable, whether the child’s theoretical obligation to support his parents in 
future could be taken into account in establishing the amount of damages. 
In summary, it is not so easy to find the arguments against compensating the 
healthy child’s maintenance costs on the basis of gained benefit. As an 
exception, the non-material benefit related to the upbringing of a child could 
offset the child’s upbringing expenses as pecuniary damage. 
At the same time, the gained benefit allows the ‘reduction’ of a considerable 
amount of non-pecuniary damage.  
W.F. Hensel has pointed out that, while the courts emphasise the inherent 
benefits of rearing a healthy child, many courts ignore these benefits if a child is 
born with a genetic defect.159 However, in the author’s opinion, the grave 
consequences of having to raise a disabled child cannot be diminished by the 
fact that the parents still obtained a child (though not the child they expected). 
D. W. Whitney and K. N. Rosenbaum too find that the benefit offset theory 
should not be applicable in the cases of wrongful birth.160 The author alleges that 
it is disputable whether the joy of a healthy child can be cast in parallel with the 
consequences of raising and caring for a disabled child. Hence, it is complicated 
to presume that damages arising from the birth of a disabled child can be offset 
by the accompanying benefits having a child brings under LOA § 127 (5).  
                                                                          
157  See more at K. C. Vikingstad. The use and abuse of the tort benefit rule in wrongful 
parentage cases. – Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 82/2, 2007. 
158 See more at M. Ramsay (see Note 79).  
159  W. F. Hensel (see Note 99), p. 154. About the case law and for analysis of application of 
the benefit rule, see K. C. Vikingstad (see Note 157), p. 1087. 
160  D.W. Whitney, K.N. Rosenbaum (see Note 59), pp. 178–179.  
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5.6. Reduction of amount of compensation  
due to parents’ part in causing damage 
Description of the Problem 
Analysis of the compensability of the damages both in the cases of wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth also gives rise to the question of whether the 
parents have caused these expenses themselves (at least in part).  
It could be alleged that the parents have failed to prevent the damage by not 
deciding in favour of termination of pregnancy at the time of discovering the 
unwanted pregnancy. Another allegation is that the parents had the possibility to 
avoid the arising of the maintenance obligation by putting the child up for 
adoption. The same arguments have been used both in the cases of wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth.161  
The aggrieved person’s part in causing damage can be taken into account 
according to LOA § 139, the first section of which states that if damage is 
caused in part by circumstances dependent on the injured party or due to a risk 
borne by the injured party, the amount of compensation for the damage shall be 
reduced to the extent that such circumstances or risk contributed to the damage. 
The question is whether the reduction of amount of compensation due to 
parents’ part in causing damage is possible in the cases of wrongful conception 
and wrongful birth. 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Damages in the cases of wrongful conception or wrongful birth shall not be 
denied or reduced on the grounds of the existence of parental opportunity to 
avoid damage by terminating the pregnancy or putting the child up for adoption. 
 
Reasoning 
The aggrieved person’s opportunities to avoid or reduce the damage and their 
effect on the compensation for the damages are generally recognised in both 
German and U.S. law. However, in cases of wrongful birth, German case law 
rejects the idea that refusal to opt for abortion or adoption should cause the 
claim to fail.162 The principle of mitigation of damages on the above-mentioned 
grounds in wrongful-birth cases has also not been applied by the U.S. courts.163 
The controversy over the argument lies in the fact that, on one hand, it is 
stated that the child is unwanted and the child-rearing expenses should be 
allowable yet, on the other hand, the parents have chosen to keep their child.164 
                                                                          
161 E.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514 (1974) 219 N.W.2d 242. 
162  H. Oetker (see Note 88), p. 302.  
163  See, for example, Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193 (1983) 447 N.E.2d 385. 
164 A. Jackson. Wrongful life and wrongful birth. – Journal of Legal Medicine, Vol. 17/3, 
1996, p. 377. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01947649609511013 
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B.C. Steininger explains that the fact that the child was unplanned does not 
prejudice the parents’ relationship to the child once it is born.165 
In consideration of the possibility of aborting the child, it could be stated 
that the existence of grounds to terminate the pregnancy does not create an 
obligation to undertake abortion. Affirming such an obligation (through 
reduction of damages in cases of wrongful birth) would constitute an enormous 
invasion of privacy.166 On a similar account, it would be highly unreasonable to 
state that damages could be mitigated by putting the child up for adoption.167 
A. Jackson has noted that the claim that the parents should have aborted the 
foetus or once born put the child up for adoption is particularly controversial. In 
situations in which parents are pleased to keep their children it is suggested that 
such action puts under strain the the argument that the parents have suffered an 
‘injury’ because of the birth of the child.168 For example, in Boone v. 
Mullendore the Supreme Court of Alabama denied the argument that the parents 
should have decided in favour of abortion or adoption.169 
According to A. Keirse and M. Schaub, the above-named allegations do not 
relieve the health-care provider from the claim to compensate the maintenance 
costs of an unplanned child. If refusing to terminate the pregnancy had to be 
considered unreasonable and the aggrieved person should have reduced the 
damage, then the liability should be divided between the health care provider 
and the patient, but definitely the unreasonable refusal to terminate the 
pregnancy does not release the health care provider from liability completely.170 
Also, in the opinion of the author, it is not correct to deny the compensation 
of the healthy or disabled child’s maintenance costs on the grounds that the 
parents have caused the costs themselves. Apparently it would be contrary to 
the principle of good faith (LOA § 6) if the health care provider relied on the 
existence of parent’s possibility to avoid damage by terminating the pregnancy 
or putting the child up for adoption.  
 
 
  
                                                                          
165  B. C. Steininger (see Note 2), p. 133. 
166  See also Rivera v. State of New York, 404 N.Y.S.2d (1978). 
167  See, for example, Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1971).  
168  A. Jackson (see Note 164), p. 377. 
169  Boone v. Mullendore, No. 80–423, 416 So. 2d 718; (1982) 
170  A. Keirse, M. Schaub. Self-Determination with a Price Tag; The Legal and Financial 
Consequences of Wrongful Conception and Wrongful Birth and the Decision of the Parents 
to Keep the Child. – Journal of European Tort Law, Vol. 1/3, 2010, p. 252‒253. –  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/jetl.2010.243  
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5.7. Scope of compensation for damages  
in cases of wrongful life 
Description of the Problem 
Although the author is of the opinion that the health-care provider should not be 
liable under Estonian law in the cases of wrongful life, the author analyses 
whether the disabled child’s expenses and damage could in principle be 
compensated under LOA. The condition of the child’s health entails additional 
expenses, which could be subject to compensation if the prerequisites for the 
health-care provider’s liability are fulfilled. 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
If the prerequisites for the health-care provider’s liability in the case of 
wrongful life were theoretically fulfilled, the child’s extraordinary expenses 
shall be compensated to the child under the Estonian LOA. 
 
Reasoning 
As stated above (see para. 5.1.3.), the German courts deny the claim in the cases 
of wrongful life. Thus there is no case law regarding the damages subject to 
compensation the cases of wrongful life. 
In the U.S., the courts that approve the health-care provider’s liability in the 
cases of wrongful life award only extraordinary expenses related to the 
necessary medical treatment, and educational expenses that follow directly from 
the child’s disability.171 Non-pecuniary damages (e.g., damages for emotional 
distress) are not granted to the parents or the disabled child.172 It should be 
noted that, unlike in, for instance, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, in 
Turpin v. Sortini the court rejected the claim for general damages (made on 
grounds of being deprived of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a 
whole, functional human being) and awarded the child compensation for the 
extraordinary expenses of special teaching, training, and hearing equipment.  
In Estonia, if the prerequisites for the health-care provider’s liability were 
met, the child’s extraordinary expenses could be subject to compensation 
according to LOA § 130 (1). While non-pecuniary damage is difficult to 
measure, pecuniary damages can be established precisely. As regards the scope 
of compensation, the author agrees with the statement made in U.S. case law 
that as the disability does not disappear when the child reaches adulthood, the 
disabled child’s medical expenses should be recovered further upon reaching of 
the age of majority.173  
                                                                          
171  K. Wevers (see Note 69), p. 266. See, for instance, Turpin v. Sortini, 182 Cal. Rptr. 377 
(1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 
656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983).  
172  J. T. Stein (see Note 92), p. 1157. 
173  Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983). 
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In Procanik v. Cillo, the court emphasised that recovery of the cost of 
extraordinary medical expenses is possible for either parents or the infant, but 
not both. In Turpin v. Sortini, the court specified that if the parents have made a 
recovery via a wrongful-birth suit, the child should recover only special costs 
incurred during his adulthood through a wrongful-life suit, so as to avoid 
double-counting.174 
In the author’s opinion, the argument that the child’s damages are recovered 
under the parents’ wrongful-birth claim does not exclude the child’s claim made 
on the basis of wrongful life. The partial overlap of the claims affects the extent 
of the damage and not the grounds for compensation.  
In Turpin v. Sortini, the court stated that the fact that the child has obtained a 
physical existence with the capacity both to receive and give love and pleasure 
and to experience pain and suffering should be treated as a benefit that should 
be offset against compensable damage.175 As W.F. Hensel has pointed out, 
while courts emphasise the inherent benefits of rearing a healthy child, many 
courts ignore these benefits if a child is born with a genetic defect.176 
In the case of wrongful life, the life as a benefit cannot be deducted from the 
compensation for the child’s extraordinary expenses. For a disabled child, being 
alive could be regarded as unsolicited enrichment that he actually aimed to 
avoid. 
 
  
                                                                          
174  M. Strasser. Wrongful life, wrongful birth, wrongful death, and the right to refuse treat-
ment: Can reasonable jurisdictions recognize all but one? – Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64/1, 
1999, pp. 849–850. 
175  Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982). 
176  I. Kennedy, A. Grubb. Medical Law. London; Edinburgh; Dublin: Reed Elsevier (UK) 
Ltd 2000, p. 154. Also, S. R. Fueger has stated that the distinction between wrongful-life and 
wrongful-pregnancy claims is unjustifiable. She alleges that the focus should be on the duty 
owed to the plaintiff, rather than on the victim. For example, in Hickman v. Myers (632 
S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)), it was discussed that the benefits of parenthood are 
one of the reasons to disallow claims of wrongful pregnancy. However, such a rationale is 
not used for refusing compensation for damages in cases of wrongful-life claims. For further 
discussion, see S. R. Fueger. The unexamined life is not worth living... or is it? Preserving 
the sanctity of life in American courtrooms. – Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 
33/3, 2009, pp. 588–589. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
Lawyers in different countries have discussed the question of compensation for 
damages in cases of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life for a 
long time. Considering the fundamental legal and ethical questions in these 
cases, the final settlement of debate in the cases of prenatal damages is highly 
unlikely. On the contrary, with the medical advancement and broadening of the 
availability of prenatal testing, the debate is likely to continue and find a wider 
audience.  
The present author has analysed the health-care provider’s possible 
obligation to compensate for damages on the basis of the health-care provider’s 
contractual and delictual liability under the Estonian LOA. 
The author has found that in cases of wrongful conception under Estonian 
law, the health-care provider should be liable under contract law and in certain 
circumstances under the law of delicts. Regarding the damages in the cases of 
wrongful conception, the Estonian courts have broad discretion according to 
LOA § 127 (2) and (3) to decide which kind of damage is recoverable in case of 
an unwanted pregnancy. In the author’s opinion, the medical expenses and loss 
of income shall be compensated, as well as the costs of a new procedure, which 
is aimed at accomplishing the purpose of the failed procedure.  
In the author’s opinion, the child’s maintenance costs should not be 
compensated as damage; as a special case the standpoint should be taken that 
the non-material benefit related to the upbringing of a child offsets the child’s 
upbringing expenses as pecuniary damage. 
As a non-pecuniary damage, the mother should be awarded a reasonable 
amount of money for the discomfort and pain related to the pregnancy and 
childbirth. Other damage (e.g. intervention in family planning), however, is 
balanced by the joy resulting from bringing up a child. 
Regarding the cases of wrongful birth, the author has come to the 
conclusion that the need to make moral judgements and to solve ethical 
dilemmas in connection to preventing the birth of a disabled child shall not 
exclude the settlement of wrongful-birth claims. The parents should be allowed 
to file a wrongful-birth claim against a health-care provider if the health-care 
provider negligently failed to inform the parents in a timely manner of their 
future child’s severe health condition, which would have given them the 
possibility to terminate the pregnancy under TPSA § 6 (2) para. 2.  
Similarly to the cases of wrongful conception, the Estonian courts have 
relatively broad discretion in specifying the recoverable damages in the cases of 
wrongful birth, as well as in determining the limits of this compensation.  
The author concludes that it is reasonable to compensate for pecuniary 
damage arising from the birth of a disabled child, e.g., the parents’ loss of 
income, along with medical expenses. The maintenance costs (both the 
expected costs of a healthy child and the additional expenses due to the 
disability) could also be compensated for under the Estonian LOA. A value 
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attributable to the benefit of the birth of a child may in principle be subtracted 
from the amount of recoverable damages. 
In principle, compensation for non-pecuniary damage is also possible. The 
non-pecuniary damage to the mother arising from the pain and inconvenience 
suffered during pregnancy and childbirth, interference with family planning – 
primarily under LOA § 134 (1) – and witnessing the child’s suffering and 
consequent death could be subject to compensation. 
The courts would also have the option of reducing the amount of 
compensation in consideration of the parents’ part in causing the damage. 
However, it should be noted that reducing the damages on grounds of the 
existence of the possibility to terminate the pregnancy or put the child up for 
adoption would be contrary to the principle of good faith.  
The author is of the opinion that in cases of wrongful life the health-care 
provider should not be liable under contract law or under the law of delicts 
under Estonian law. While TPSA § 6 (2) 2 provides for an abortion in circum-
stances where there exists the risk of a child being born with a severe physical 
or mental abnormality, it could be concluded that the child himself is unlikely to 
have a successful wrongful-life claim. 
The obstacles in overcoming the non-existence paradox, as well as problems 
in establishing the prerequisites for the health-care provider’s civil liability on a 
delictual or contractual basis, lead to the assertion that satisfying these claims in 
Estonian courts would be unlikely, similarly to German and a majority of U.S. 
courts.  
However, if the prerequisites of the health-care provider’s liability in the 
case of wrongful life are fulfilled, the child’s extraordinary expenses shall be 
compensated to the child under Estonian LOA. 
Undoubtedly, the cases of prenatal damages raise ethical and moral 
concerns. However, the named concerns should not prevent the finding of a 
solution in these cases, considering an outcome that seeks to balance the 
interests of the child, his or her parents and the health-care provider. Although 
the claims of wrongful life, wrongful conception and wrongful birth have not 
yet reached Estonian courtrooms, the author hopes that the solutions offered in 
this dissertation could be helpful to the courts and serve as guidelines in 
developing case law. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja tsiviilõiguslik vastutus  
sünnieelsete kahjustuste kaasustes 
Käesolevas väitekirjas käsitletakse tervishoiuteenuse osutaja lepingulist ja 
deliktiõiguslikku vastutust lapse vanemate ees soovimatu raseduse (ingl. k. 
wrongful conception) ja soovimatu puudega lapse sünni (ingl. k. wrongful birth) 
korral ning tervishoiuteenuse osutaja võimalikku vastutust lapse ees tema 
puudega sünni korral (nn. soovimatu elu kaasus, ingl. k. wrongful life). Eel-
nimetatud kolme kaasust nimetatakse väitekirjas kokkuvõtlikult sünnieelsete 
kahjustuste kaasusteks.  
Käesolev väitekiri põhineb autori poolt avaldatud neljal õigusteaduslikul 
artiklil: 
 
• “The Possibility of Compensation for Damages in Cases of Wrongful Con-
ception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. An Estonian Perspective”.178 
Nimetatud artiklis selgitatakse Eesti tervishoiuteenuse osutaja lepingulise ja 
deliktilise vastutuse õiguslikku raamistikku ja analüüsitakse peamisi õigus-
likke probleeme käsitlevates kaasustes.  
• “The Health-care Provider’s Civil Liability in the Cases of Wrongful Life. 
An Estonian Perspective”.179 Artikkel keskendub Eesti tervishoiuteenuse 
osutaja tsiviilõigusliku vastutuse võimalikkuse hindamisele puudega lapse 
nõude alusel. 
• “Damages Subject to Compensation in Cases of Wrongful Birth: A Solution 
to Suit Estonia”.180 Artiklis analüüsitakse, milline kahju võiks kuuluda Eesti 
võlaõigusseaduse alusel hüvitamisele puudega lapse sünni korral. 
• “The Obligation of the Health-care Provider to Compensate for Damages in 
Case of Wrongful Conception: a Model to Suit Estonian Law”.181 Artikkel 
käsitleb Eesti tervishoiuteenuse osutaja kahju hüvitamise kohustust soovi-
matu raseduse korral.  
 
Väitekirja eesmärgiks on selgitada välja, kas ja millises ulatuses peaks tervis-
hoiuteenuse osutaja vastutama Eesti tsiviilõiguse järgi soovimatu raseduse, 
soovimatu puudega lapse sünni ja nn. soovimatu elu kaasustes, et tagatud oleks 
nii lapse, tema vanemate kui ka tervishoiuteenuse osutaja huvidega arvestamine.  
Töö eesmärgi saavutamiseks uuris autor alljärgnevaid uurimisküsimusi: 
 
                                                                          
178  European Journal of Health Law, Vol. 21/2, 2014, pp. 141–160. 
179  Juridica International, Vol. 23, 2015, pp. 43–51. 
180  Juridica International, Vol. 24, 2016, pp. 105–115. 
181  Journal of Medical Law and Ethics, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2016, pp. 95–111. 
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1. Kas Eesti õiguse järgi on sünnieelsete kahjustuste korral võimalik tervis-
hoiuteenuse osutaja lepinguõiguslik vastutus või deliktiõiguslik vastutus või 
mõlemad? 
2. Kas ja millise kahju hüvitamine on põhjendatud soovimatu raseduse 
kaasuste puhul? 
3. Kas ja millise kahju hüvitamine on põhjendatud puudega lapse sünni 
kaasuste puhul? 
4. Kas ja mis ulatuses on põhjendatud soovimatu raseduse ja puudega lapse 
sünni kaasuste puhul lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamine? 
5. Kas ja mis ulatuses mõjutab kahjuhüvitise ulatust soovimatu raseduse ja 
puudega lapse sünni kaasuste puhul põhimõte, et kahjuhüvitisest tuleb maha 
arvata kannatanu poolt saadud kasu? 
6. Kas ja mis ulatuses tuleks arvestada soovimatu raseduse ja puudega lapse 
sünni kaasuste puhul kahjuhüvitise ulatuse juures vanemate kui kannatanute 
osaga kahju tekkimisel?  
 
Autor on kasutanud väitekirjas peamiselt võrdlevat uurimismeetodit: Eesti 
õigust võrreldakse Saksa ja Ameerika Ühendriikide õiguse ja kohtupraktikaga. 
Saksa õigus on valitud võrdlusmaterjaliks seetõttu, et germaani õigusperekonna 
mudel, sh eelkõige Saksa õigus (kuid ka kohtupraktikas väljakujunenud seisu-
kohad ja teoreetilised allikad) on olnud Eesti tsiviilõiguse loomisel üheks 
oluliseks eeskujuks. Ameerika Ühendriikide õigus on aga valitud ootuses leida 
sealt käsitlusi, mis oleksid universaalse iseloomuga, st rakendatavad muuhulgas 
ka nt Eesti kohtupraktikas. Võrdluse tulemusel on autor jõudnud järeldusteni, 
kas ja millises ulatuses on otstarbekas ja mõistlik hüvitada kahju sünnieelsete 
kahjustuste korral.  
Väitekirja uurimisobjekt on piiritletud vanema(te) ja lapse enda kahju hüvi-
tamise nõuetega tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastu olukorras, kus tervishoiu-
teenuse osutaja hooletuse (ravivea või diagnoosivea ja sellest tuleneva teabe 
andmise kohustuse rikkumise) tulemusel on vanemad jäänud ilma võimalusest 
realiseerida oma pere planeerimisõigust ja langetada õigeaegselt otsus raseduse 
jätkamiseks või katkestamiseks.  
Väitekiri ei käsitle eeltoodud asjaoludel tõusetuvaid muid võimalikke nõu-
deid (nt lapse nõuet vanemate vastu, vanemate omavahelisi nõudeid, nõudeid 
ravimitootja vastu jne). Samuti jäävad käsitletavate kaasuste piiridest välja 
olukorrad, kus lapse puue on põhjustatud tervishoiuteenuse osutaja enda hoole-
tusest.  
Alljärgnevalt esitab autor kokkuvõtte töös esitatud väidetest ja nende 
põhjendustest.  
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1. Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja kahju hüvitamise kohustus lepinguõiguse ja 
deliktiõiguse alusel soovimatu raseduse korral 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Soovimatu raseduse korral saab Eesti õiguse järgi tervishoiuteenuse osutajat 
võtta vastutusele nii lepingu rikkumisest tulenevalt, kuid teatud juhtudel ka 
deliktiõiguse alusel. 
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Soovimatu raseduse kaasuste all peetakse silmas lapse vanema või vanemate 
nõuet tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastu viimase hooletuse tõttu soovimatu, ehkki 
terve lapse sündimisega seotud kahju hüvitamiseks. Soovimatu raseduse kaasusi 
iseloomustab seega asjaolu, et lapse vanemad on soovinud rasedust vältida, kuid 
tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vea tõttu on vanemad kaotanud võimaluse realiseerida 
oma pereplaneerimise õigust ning otsustada last mitte saada. 
Eesti õiguse alusel saab väita, et alati, kui tervishoiuteenuse osutaja on osu-
tanud patsiendile tervishoiuteenust, on nende vahel sõlmitud ka tervishoiu-
teenuse osutamise leping (VÕS § 759). Kuivõrd raseduse ennetamisele või 
raseduse katkestamisele suunatud protseduuri ebaõnnestumine on üldjuhul 
tervishoiuteenuse osutamise lepingust tuleneva kohustuse rikkumise tagajärg, 
saab tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastutuse õigusliku alusena tulla esmajoones 
kõne alla lepinguõiguslik vastutus (VÕS § 770 lg 1 ja 2).  
Lepinguõigusliku vastutuse keskseks eelduseks on kohustuse rikkumine. 
Soovimatu raseduse korral võib see kohustuse rikkumine seisneda nt ebaõnnes-
tunud steriliseerimise või raseduse katkestamise protseduuris või raseduse diag-
noosimata jätmises. Samuti võib tegemist olla kohustuse rikkumisega rasedus-
vastase nõuande andmisel või vahendi soovitamisel või fertiilsuse ebaõige 
diagnoosimisega. Lisaks võib kohustuse rikkumine seisneda ka hooletuses 
operatsioonieelsel või -järgsel nõustamisel. Eesti õiguse alusel tuleb nimetatud 
kohustusi hinnata VÕS § 762 alusel, mille esimese lause kohaselt peab tervis-
hoiuteenus vastama vähemalt arstiteaduse üldisele tasemele teenuse osutamise 
ajal ja seda tuleb osutada tervishoiuteenuse osutajalt tavaliselt oodatava hoolega. 
Riigikohus on 3. oktoobri 2006 otsuses kohtuasjas nr 3-2-1-78-06 punktis 12 
selgitanud, et kui ravivõtet kasutanud arsti tegutsemise kvaliteet on madalam kui 
vastava eriala haritud ja kogenud arsti oma, siis võib tegemist olla raviveaga. 
Lisaks kohustuse rikkumisele peab kahju hüvitamise kohustuse üldiste 
eeldustena esinema loomulikult ka kahju ning põhjuslik seos kahju ja kohustuse 
rikkumise vahel. Eesti õiguse järgi on tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastutuse 
eelduseks VÕS § 770 lg 1 alusel lisaks ka tema süü (vastutuse korral VÕS 
§ 770 lg 2 alusel teda abistavate isikute tegevuse eest ei ole süü tervishoiu-
teenuse osutaja vastutuse eelduseks). Ehkki reeglina ei või tervishoiuteenuse 
osutaja lubada patsiendi paranemist või operatsiooni edukust (VÕS § 766 lg 2), 
siis juhul, kui tervishoiuteenuse osutamise lepingu esemeks on raseduse 
ennetamisele või raseduse katkestamisele suunatud protseduuri läbiviimine, 
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kujutab sellise protseduuri ebaõnnestumine endast raviviga tervishoiuteenuse 
osutaja poolt. 
Seega võib väita, et VÕS-i alusel ei tohiks tervishoiuteenuse osutaja lepingu-
õigusliku vastutuse eelduste tuvastamine olla soovimatu raseduse korral üldiselt 
problemaatiline. Omaette probleemide ring seondub küsimusega, keda vastav 
tervishoiuteenuse osutamise leping kaitseb, st kas kahju hüvitamise nõue tervis-
hoiuteenuse osutaja vastu võib tekkida ka teisel vanemal, kes ei olnud tervis-
hoiuteenuse osutamise lepingu pooleks. Autori arvates saab soovimatu raseduse 
kaasuste puhul väita, et tervishoiuteenuse osutaja peab üldjuhul ära tundma, et 
tervishoiuteenuse osutamise leping on suunatud ka kolmanda isiku (teise 
vanema) huvide ja õiguste kaitsmisele (VÕS § 81).  
Soovimatu raseduse kaasustes võivad olla lisaks lepingulise vastutuse eel-
dustele olla samaaegselt täidetud ka deliktiõigusliku vastutuse eeldused. Eesti 
õiguses reguleerib lepingulise ja deliktiõigusliku vastutuse konkurentsiprob-
leeme VÕS § 1044.  
Deliktiõigusliku vastutuse puhul on oluline eristada, mida tegi tervishoiu-
teenuse osutaja soovimatu raseduse ärahoidmiseks. Deliktiõiguslik vastutus on 
soovimatu raseduse puhul võimalik aktiivse ja vahetu käitumisega patsiendi 
kehasse sekkumise korral (nt ebaõnnestunud operatsioon), millega on tekitatud 
patsiendi tervisekahjustus, mis on õigusvastane VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 2 kohaselt. 
Eesti kohtupraktikas ega õiguskirjanduses ei ole küsimuses, kas soovimatu 
rasedus kujutab endast kehavigastust, seisukohta võetud. Autor on seisukohal, 
et kannatanule valikuvabaduse andmise eesmärgil (kas kvalifitseerida oma nõue 
lepingu rikkumisest või deliktist tulenevalt) ei ole välistatud soovimatu raseduse 
põhjustamist kehavigastusena käsitleda. Kindlasti ei ole põhjendatud käsitleda 
tervisekahjustusena loote olemasolu, vaid pigem seda, et isik jäeti ilma võima-
lusest otsustada oma keha üle. Soovimatu raseduse põhjustamine võib kujutada 
endast nii isikliku õiguse rikkumist kui ka tervisekahjustust.  
Juhul, kui tervishoiuteenuse osutaja patsiendi kehasse aktiivselt ei sekku ja 
tervishoiuteenuse osutajale etteheidetav käitumine seisneb ebaõige diagnoosi ja 
ravi määrmises või patsiendi teavitamise kohustuse rikkumises (nt ebaõiges 
nõustamises), tuleks deliktiõigusliku vastutuse jaatamiseks leida mingisugune 
kohustus, mida tervishoiuteenuse osutaja on rikkunud. Diagnoosiviga või 
teavitamiskohustuse rikkumine kui selline ei kujuta autori arvates endast 
õigusvastast käitumist VÕS § 1045 mõttes. Autori arvates on väga kaheldav, 
kas tervishoiuteenuse osutaja võiks olla ka üldisest käibekohustusest tulenevalt 
kohustatud rasedust ennetama või ära hoidma. Seega, kui tervishoiuteenuse 
osutaja aktiivselt patsiendi kehasse ei sekku, deliktiõiguslik vastutus üldjuhul ei 
rakendu. 
Pelgalt pereplaneerimisõigusesse sekkumisele kui isikuõiguse rikkumisele 
(VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 4) tuginemine ei tohiks samuti üldjuhul deliktilist vastutust 
kaasa tuua, sest nimetatud juhul tõrjub lepingu olemasolu deliktiõigusliku 
vastutuse VÕS § 1044 lg 2 alusel välja. 
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2. Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja kahju hüvitamise kohustus lepinguõiguse ja 
deliktiõiguse alusel puudega lapse sünni korral 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Puudega lapse sünni korral saab Eesti õiguse järgi tervishoiuteenuse osutajat 
võtta vastutusele lepinguõiguslikul alusel. Deliktiõiguslikku vastutust ei saa 
järgneda õigusvastasuse puudumise tõttu VÕS § 1045 mõttes.  
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Kui soovimatu raseduse kaasuste puhul on soovinud vanemad rasedust ja lapse 
sündi ära hoida, siis soovimatu puudega lapse sünni kaasuste puhul on vanemad 
küll soovinud last, kuid mitte puudega last. Puudega lapse sünni kaasuste puhul 
nõuavad lapse vanem(ad) tervishoiuteenuse osutajalt viimase hooletuse tõttu 
puudega lapse sündimisega seotud kahju hüvitamist, heites tervishoiuteenuse 
osutajale ette loote tervisliku seisundi õigeaegset diagnoosimata jätmist.  
RKSS § 6 lg 2 p 2 kohaselt võib kauem kui 12 ning vähem kui 22 nädalat 
kestnud raseduse katkestada, kui sündival lapsel võib olla raske vaimne või 
kehaline tervisekahjustus. Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja hooletuse tõttu ei teki 
vanematel võimalust langetada õigeaegselt otsus, kas loote tervisliku seisundi 
tõttu rasedusega jätkata või see katkestada. Siinkohal on oluline rõhutada, et 
lapse puude põhjustajaks ei ole tervishoiuteenuse osutaja.  
Puudega lapse sünni korral võib kohustuse rikkumine tervishoiuteenuse osu-
taja poolt seisneda diagnoosiveas ja sellele järgnevas teavitamiskohustuse 
rikkumises. Diagnoosivea tõttu ei hoiata tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vanemaid 
ette, et nende laps võib sündida puudega, mida vanematel olnuks võimalik 
RKSS § 6 lg 2 p 2 kohaselt vältida. Keskne küsimus on selles, kas tervishoiu-
teenuse osutaja tegevus vastas temalt oodatavale tervishoiuteenuse osutamise 
kvaliteedile (VÕS § 762).  
Nii soovimatu raseduse kaasustes kui ka puudega lapse sünni kaasustes küsi-
mus sellest, keda tervishoiuteenuse osutamise leping kaitseb, st kas kahju 
hüvitamise nõue tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastu võib tekkida ka teisel vanemal, 
kes ei olnud tervishoiuteenuse osutamise lepingu pooleks. Autori arvates saab 
ka puudega lapse sünni kaasuste puhul väita, et tervishoiuteenuse osutaja pidi 
üldjuhul ära tundma, et tervishoiuteenuse osutamise leping on suunatud ka 
kolmanda isiku (teise vanema) huvide ja õiguste kaitsmisele (VÕS § 81). 
Lisaks tuleb tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastutuse kindlaksmääramisel võtta 
arvesse lapse puude raskusastet. Peaks olema selge, et puudega lapse sünni kaa-
sustes ei anna nõude esitamiseks alust igasugune defekt, vaid eelkõige selline 
tervislik seisund, mis andnuks alust raseduse katkestamiseks RKSS § 6 lg 2 p 2 
alusel, s.o raske vaimne või kehaline tervisekahjustus. Seda, kas konkreetne 
defekt annab alust nõude esitamiseks puudega lapse sünni kaasustes, tuleks 
igakordselt kaasusepõhiselt hinnata. 
Muuhulgas peaks hageja puudega lapse sünni kaasuses tõendama, et hageja 
oleks raseduse katkestanud, kui ta oleks olnud teadlik sellest, et laps võib 
sündida puudega. Ehkki eeltoodu tõendamine on ilmselt keeruline, on sellest 
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hoolimata enamus kohtutest Saksamaal ja Ameerika Ühendriikides jaatanud 
vanemate nõuet puudega lapse sünni korral ning tervishoiuteenuse osutaja 
vastavat vastutust. Süü puudumine välistaks tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastutuse 
vaid juhul, kui tal ei olnud võimalik sündmuste käiku mõjutada. 
Kui eeltoodud lepingulise vastutuse eeldused on täidetud, vastutab tervis-
hoiuteenuse osutaja puudega lapse sünni korral lepingu rikkumisest tulenevalt. 
Lisaks ei välista lepinguline vastutus vastutust deliktiõiguslikul alusel. Siiski on 
autor seisukohal, et puudega lapse sünni kaasustes ei ole alust tervishoiuteenuse 
osutaja deliktiõiguslikuks vastutuseks.  
Deliktiõiguslik vastutus sõltub VÕS § 1044 lg 2 tõlgendamisest ja hinnan-
gust, millise kahju tekkimist sooviti lepingulise kohustusega ära hoida. Autor on 
seisukohal, et kuna tervishoiuteenuse osutaja ei põhjusta lapse puuet, siis ei saa 
deliktiõigusliku vastutuse aluseks olla VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p-st 2 tulenev õigus-
vastasus. Samuti ei ole teavitamiskohustuse rikkumine iseenesest õigusvastane 
VÕS § 1045 alusel. Teavitamiskohustuse täitmise eesmärk on hoida ära pat-
siendi isiklike õiguste kahjustamine. Ka pereplaneerimisse sekkumine kui isik-
liku õiguse kahjustamine ei too kaasa deliktiõiguslikku vastutust, sest lepingu-
õiguslik vastutus tõrjub sel juhul deliktiõigusliku vastutuse välja (VÕS § 1044 
lg 2). Samal põhjusel ei vastuta tervishoiuteenuse osutaja deliktiõiguslikul 
alusel ka vanematevahelise suhte kui isikliku õiguse võimaliku kahjustamise 
eest. 
 
 
3. Tervishoiuteenuse osutaja kahju hüvitamise kohustus lepinguõiguse ja 
deliktiõiguse alusel soovimatu elu kaasustes 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Puudega lapse sünni korral ei vastuta tervishoiuteenuse osutaja lapse ees ei 
lepinguõiguse ega deliktiõiguse alusel. 
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
VÕS § 127 lg 1 alusel on kahju hüvitamise eesmärgiks kahjustatud isiku aseta-
mine olukorda, mis on võimalikult lähedane olukorrale, milles ta oleks olnud, 
kui kahju hüvitamise kohustuse aluseks olevat asjaolu ei oleks esinenud. 
Puudega lapse enda kahju hüvitamise nõude puhul tähendaks eeltoodu, et 
võrrelda tuleb olukorda, kus laps on sündinud puudega, olukorraga, kus laps ei 
oleks üldse sündinud. Nimetatu tekitab aga nn mitte-eksisteerimise paradoksi 
situatsiooni, mille tõttu ei kuulu puudega lapse esitatud nõuded tervishoiu-
teenuse osutaja vastu Saksamaal ega ka enamikus Ameerika Ühendriikide osa-
riikides rahuldamisele. Autori arvates ei ole ka Eesti õiguse alusel võimalik 
ületada puudega lapse enda kahju hüvitamise nõude puhul nn mitte-eksisteeri-
mise paradoksi.  
Teoreetiliselt oleks Eesti õiguse alusel võimalik lapse ema ja tervishoiu-
teenuse osutaja vahelist lepingut pidada kolmandat isikut kaitsvaks lepinguks 
VÕS § 81 mõttes olenemata sellest, et lepingu sõlmimise ajal ei olnud laps veel 
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sündinud. Siiski ei saa laps olla lepinguga kaitstud isikuks selles mõttes, et 
leping pidanuks ära hoidma tema sünni. Lisaks ei ole autori arvates lapse huvid 
seotud lepinguga samal määral kui tema ema või vanemate huvid. Seega ei ole 
autori arvates alust rakendada lapse nõude puhul tervishoiuteenuse osutaja 
lepingulist vastutust.  
Autori arvates ei vastuta tervishoiuteenuse osutaja ka deliktiõiguslikul 
alusel, sest on väga vaieldav, kas lapse seadusega kaitstud mingisugune huvi 
saab kahjustada sellega, et ta sünnib puudega. Nagu ka vanemate nõude puhul 
puudega lapse sünni korral, tuleb ka samadel asjaoludel esitatava lapse nõude 
puhul pidada silmas, et tervishoiuteenuse osutaja ei põhjusta lapse puuet (seega 
ei ole tema tegu õigusvastane VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 2 mõttes), vaid tervishoiu-
teenuse osutajale etteheidetav tegu seisneb diagnoosiveas. Lisaks ei ole ka alust 
jaatada lapse isikuõiguse kahjustamist (VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 4) ega seadusest 
tuleneva kohustuse rikkumist (VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 7) tervishoiuteenuse osutaja 
poolt. Lapse puude diagnoosimata jätmine ei saa kujutada endast õigusvastast 
kahju tekitamist, sest ei ole deliktiõiguslikku kaitsenormi, mis kohustaks tervis-
hoiuteenuse osutajat lapse puuet diagnoosima. RKSS § 6 lg 2 p 2 ei tekita 
kohustust vanemale ega tervishoiuteenuse osutajale ning ei tekita lapsele endale 
õigust/huvi raseduse katkestamiseks. Järelikult ei ole alust ka deliktiõigusliku 
vastutuse rakendamiseks.  
 
 
4. Kahju hüvitamise ulatus soovimatu raseduse korral 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Soovimatu raseduse korral annavad VÕS § 127 lg 2 ja 3 kohtutele laia 
diskretsiooni otsustamaks, milline kahju kuulub vanematele hüvitamisele. 
Hüvitamisele peaksid kuuluma ravikulud ja sissetuleku vähenemine, samuti 
ebaõnnestunud protseduuri eesmärgi saavutamisele suunatud uue protseduuri 
kulu. VÕS § 134 lg 2 alusel on hüvitatav ka mittevaraline kahju, kui käsitleda 
soovimatut rasedust naise tervisekahjustusena. Lisaks on iseenesest hüvitatav 
mittevaraline kahju seoses pereplaneerimisesse sekkumise kui isikliku õiguse 
rikkumisega.  
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Lisaks ravikuludele ja sissetuleku kaotusele tuleb soovimatu raseduse puhul 
varalise kahjuna kõne alla lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamine, mida käesolevas 
töös on autor eraldi analüüsinud (vt p. 6).  
Kui käsitleda soovimatut rasedust naise tervisekahjustusena, võimaldab 
VÕS § 130 lg 1 nõuda emal hõlpsalt nii ravikulude kui sissetuleku vähene-
misest tingitud kahju hüvitamist. Hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju üle otsustamisel 
tuleb arvestada lisaks ka üldiste kahju hüvitamise piirangutega. Nii tuleb VÕS 
§ 127 lg 2 alusel arvestada sellega, kas rikutud kohustuse või normi eesmärk oli 
hoida ära just sellist kahju nagu antud juhul tekkis. Lepinguõiguse alusel 
esitatava nõude puhul tuleb arvestada ka kahju ettenähtavusega (VÕS § 127 
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lg 3). Nimetatud sätted jätavad kohtule tegelikult laia diskretsiooni otsustamaks, 
milline kahju soovimatu raseduse puhul hüvitamisele kuulub, st millise kahju 
väljamõistmine on õiglane.  
Esialgse ebaõnnestunud protseduuri kulude käsitlemine patsiendi kahjuna on 
küsitav, sest vastavad kulud ei tekkinud protseduuri ebaõnnestumise tagajärjel. 
Pigem saaksid kahjuna olla käsitletavad need kulud, mis tekivad uuest protse-
duurist (millega nt püütakse algse ebaõnnestunud protseduuri eesmärki 
saavutada).  
Lisaks varalisele kahjule tuleb soovimatu raseduse kaasustes Eesti VÕS-i 
järgi kõne alla ka mittevaralise kahju hüvitamise nõue. Juhul, kui soovimatut 
rasedust käsitleda tervisekahju põhjustamisena, tuleks kohaldada VÕS § 134  
lg-t 2, millest tulenevalt kaasneb tervisekahjustusega mittevaralise kahju hüvitis 
automaatselt. Mittevaralise kahjuna tuleks emale sellisel juhul hüvitada mõistlik 
summa füüsiliste ebamugavuste ja valu eest. 
VÕS § 134 lg 2 võimaldab nõuda mittevaralise kahju hüvitamist ka üksnes 
isikuõiguse rikkumise korral. Seega on võimalik kohtul rahuldada mittevaralise 
kahju hüvitamise nõue VÕS § 134 lg 2 alusel eelkõige juhul, kui kohus leiab, et 
pereplaneerimisse sekkumine on käsitletav isikuõiguse rikkumisena. Nimetatud 
säte saab olla nõude rahuldamise aluseks ka juhul, kui Eesti kohtupraktikas 
peaks asutama seisukohale, et soovimatu rasedus ei ole käsitletav naise tervise-
kahjustusena, vaid üksnes tema isikuõiguse – otsustada ise oma keha üle – 
rikkumisena.  
Juhul, kui mittevaralise kahju hüvitamise nõue esitatakse lepingu rikku-
misest tulenevalt, tuleb kohaldada ka VÕS § 134 lg-t 1, mille kohaselt tuleb 
hinnata, kas lepingu täitmine oli suunatud ka mittevaralise huvi järgimisele. 
Autori arvates saab väita, et kohustus viia läbi protseduurid, mille eesmärgiks 
on raseduse ärahoidmine või katkestamine, on suunatud eelkõige mittevaralise 
huvi järgimisele, kuigi võib samaaegselt järgida ka varalist huvi.  
Eeltoodu ei välista iseenesest lapse sünnist ja kasvatamisest saadava kasu 
mahaarvamist kahjuhüvitisest (VÕS § 127 lg 5) ja kahjustatud isiku enda osa 
arvestamist kahju tekkimisel (VÕS § 139 lg 1), mida autor on eraldi ana-
lüüsinud (vt p-d 7 ja 8).  
 
 
5. Kahju hüvitamise ulatus puudega lapse sünni korral 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Puudega lapse sünni kaasustes annavad VÕS § 127 lg 2 ja 3 kohtutele laia dis-
kretsiooni otsustamaks, milline kahju kuulub vanematele hüvitamisele. Hüvita-
misele peaksid kuuluma ravikulud ja sissetuleku vähenemine raseduse ajal ja 
tingituna vajadusest hoolitseda puudega lapse eest, samuti ebaõnnestunud 
protseduuri eesmärgi saavutamisele suunatud uue protseduuri kulu. VÕS § 134 lg 
2 alusel on hüvitatav ka mittevaraline kahju seoses valu ja kannatustega raseduse 
ja sünnituse ajal. Samuti on hüvitatav mittevaraline kahju seoses pere-
planeerimisse sekkumise kui isikliku õiguse rikkumisega ja mittevaraline kahju 
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juhul, kui vanem(ad) on vahetuks tunnistajaks lapse kannatustele ja järgnevale 
surmale.  
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Saksamaal ega Ameerika Ühendriikides ei ole kohtud asunud ühtsele seisu-
kohale, milline kahju tuleks hüvitada puudega lapse sünni korral.  
Autori arvates on tervishoiuteenuse osutamise leping, mille sisuks on sünni-
eelne diagnostika tuvastamaks loote võimalikud defektid, suunatud nii varalise 
kui ka mittevaralise huvi järgimisele. Nagu ka soovimatu raseduse puhul, 
annavad VÕS § 127 lg 2 ja 3 kohtutele puudega lapse sünni kaasustes laia 
diskretsiooni otsustamaks, milline kahju kuulub vanematele hüvitamisele. 
VÕS § 130 lg 1 alusel on emal võimalik hõlpsalt nõuda nii ravikulude kui 
sissetuleku vähenemisest tingitud kahju (mis võib seonduda ka puudega lapse 
eest hoolitsemisega) hüvitamist. Lisaks tuleks hüvitada ebaõnnestunud sünni-
eelse diagnostika kulud.  
Lisaks varalisele kahjule tuleb puudega lapse sünni kaasustes Eesti VÕS-i 
järgi kõne alla ka mittevaralise kahju hüvitamise nõue. Kuna tervishoiuteenuse 
osutaja lepingulise kohustuse eesmärgiks on ka järgida patsiendi mittevaralist 
huvi, on VÕS § 134 lg 2 alusel võimalik nõuda mittevaralise kahju hüvitist ka 
isikuõiguste rikkumise korral. Sellise nõude edukus sõltub sellest, kas RKSS § 6 
lg 2 p-st 2 tulenevat õigust katkestada rasedus, kui sündival lapsel võib olla 
raske vaimne või kehaline tervisekahjustus, saab pidada isiku enesemääramise 
õiguseks. Autori arvates saab RKSS § 6 lg 2 p-st 2 tulenevat õigust pidada isiku 
enesemääramise õiguseks. Järelikult tuleks hüvitada mittevaraline kahju 
seonduvalt pereplaneerimisse sekkumisega.  
Mittevaralise kahjuna ei kuulu hüvitamisele vanemate võimalik frustratsioon 
ja pettumus seoses ootamatult puudega lapse vanemaks saamisega. Küll on aga 
mittevaralise kahju hüvitamine võimalik VÕS § 134 lg 3 alusel, kui vanemad on 
nt tunnistajaks lapse surmale ja kogevad valu ja kannatust, nähes oma lapse 
kannatusi.  
Siiski ei ole varalise ja mittevaralise kahju hüvitamine täies ulatuses auto-
maatne, vaid kahju täielikku hüvitamist piiravad VÕS-i mitmed sätted, mida 
analüüsitakse allpool (vt p-d 7 ja 8).  
 
 
6. Lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamise põhjendatus soovimatu raseduse ja 
puudega lapse sünni korral 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Terve lapse ülalpidamiskulud ei kuulu hüvitamisele soovimatu raseduse kaa-
sustes. Puudega lapse sünni korral tuleks vanematele hüvitada puudega lapse 
ülalpidamiskulud täies ulatuses.  
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Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Võib väita, et põhiliseks diskussiooniobjektiks soovimatu raseduse ja puudega 
lapse sünni kaasuste puhul on olnud eelkõige küsimus, kas hüvitatavaks kahjuks 
on lapse ülalpidamiskulud. Saksamaa kohtupraktikas on leitud, et terve lapse 
keskmised ülalpidamiskulud tuleb hüvitada. Ameerika Ühendriikides on vaid 
mõned osariigid, mille kohtud leiavad, et terve lapse keskmised ülalpidamis-
kulud kuuluvad hüvitamisele.  
Kui alustada lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamise põhjendatuse hindamist 
põhjusliku seose kindlakstegemisest, siis tuleks võtta lähtealuseks conditio sine 
qua non reegel: ilma tervishoiuteenuse osutaja veata ei oleks vanematel tekki-
nud ka lapse ülalpidamise kulusid. Seega on tervishoiuteenuse osutaja eksimus 
igal juhul põhjustanud lapse ülalpidamiskulud. Eelnimetatud reeglist lähtu-
misele on siiski mitmeid vastuargumente, sh et vanema ülalpidamiskohustuse 
kui ühe fundamentaalse väärtuse tekkimine kolmanda isiku hooletuse tõttu ei 
ole piisav selleks, et ülalpidamiskohustus läheks üle kolmandale isikule. Samuti 
saab väita, et lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamine viib negatiivse väärtushin-
nangu andmiseni lapsele ja tekitab talle psühholoogilist kahju, kui ta saab teada 
vanemate nõudest tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastu. Samal ajal tuleb aga arves-
tada sellega, et ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamise nõude rahuldamine võib siiski 
olla nii lapse enda kui ka terve perekonna huvides. 
Autori arvates ei ole lihtne leida õigustust vähemalt kahju hüvitamist regu-
leerivate sätete seast, miks tuleks jätta lapse üleskasvatamise kulud tervishoiu-
teenuse osutajalt välja mõistmata. Siiski läheb ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamine 
autori arvates vastuollu mõistlikkuse põhimõtte ja kahju hüvitamise õiguse ratio 
legis`ega. Sisuliselt nõuab küsimuse lahendus kohtult väärtusotsustuse tegemist.  
Autori arvates võiks probleemi lahendust otsida kasu mahaarvamise argu-
mendist. Kuigi üldise käsitluse järgi saab arvesse võtta üksnes samaliigilist 
kasu, ei võimalda soovimatu raseduse kaasuses eelnimetatud põhimõtte järgi-
mine hinnata juhtunut tervikuna. Lapse üleskasvatamise kulude väljamõistmata 
jätmiseks on autori arvates kohtul tarvis teha väärtusotsustus, mis lähtub sellest, 
et lapse kasvatamisest saadav mittevaraline kasu tasakaalustab erijuhtumina 
tema ülalpidamise kulud kui kahju. Pealegi ei sätesta VÕS § 127 lg 5, et arvesse 
tuleks tingimata võtta üksnes samaliigilist kasu.  
Lisaargumendina saaks toetuda VÕS § 127 lg-le 2 ja väita, et rikutud kohus-
tuse eesmärgiks konkreetsel juhul ei olnud lapse ülalpidamiskulude tekkimise 
ärahoidmine. Seda argumenti on lihtsam kasutada juhul, kui raseduse ärahoid-
mise või katkestamise soovi tingisid meditsiinilised näidustused. Teisalt, kui 
raseduse katkestamise või ennetamise põhjuseks on nt perekonna halb majan-
duslik seisund, mille tõttu soovitakse ülalpeetavate arvu piirata, siis on keeru-
line väita, et rikutud kohustuse eesmärgiks ei olnud ära hoida lapse ülalpidamis-
kohustusega kaasnevaid kulutusi. Sellise kahju ettenähtavus ei tohiks üldjuhul 
probleemiks kujuneda. 
Kokkuvõttes ei peaks autori arvates soovimatu raseduse kaasustes olema 
hüvitatavad terve lapse ülalpidamiskulud. 
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Mis puudutab puudega lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamist vanematele, siis 
sellised ülalpidamiskulud hüvitatakse Saksamaa kohtupraktikas täies ulatuses. 
Ameerika Ühendriikide kohtupraktikas peetakse põhjendatuks aga üksnes lapse 
puudest tingitud lisakulude hüvitamise. 
Perekonnaseaduse § 97 p 3 kohaselt on ülalpidamist õigustatud saama ka 
muu abivajav alaneja või üleneja sugulane, kes ei ole võimeline ennast ise ülal 
pidama. Autori arvates ei kaalu võimalik negatiivse väärtushinnangu omista-
mine lapsele, mis kaasneb puudega lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamisega üles 
nende kulude hüvitamisest saadavat kasu lapse jaoks. Puudega lapse ülal-
pidamiskulude hüvitamine aitab vanematel pakkuda lapsele paremat vajalikku 
ravi ja hoolitsust. Seega nii puudest tingitud lisakulutused kui ka üldine ülal-
pidamiskulu tuleks puudega lapse sünni puhul hüvitada. Kasu mahaarvamise 
argument ei ole puudega lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamise juures autori 
arvates relevantne.  
 
 
7. Lapse sünnist ja kasvatamisest saadava kasu mahaarvamine kahjuhüvi-
tisest soovimatu raseduse ja puudega lapse sünni kaasustes 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Lapse sünnist ja kasvatamisest saadavat kasu vanematele tuleb võtta arvesse 
soovimatu raseduse korral, st terve lapse sünni korral. Puudega lapse sünd ei too 
kaasa kasu, mis oleks VÕS § 127 lg 5 alusel maha arvatav vanematele välja-
mõistmisele kuuluvast hüvitisest. 
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Soovimatu raseduse juhtumitel võib vanematel lisaks kahjule tekkida siiski ka 
varalist ja mittevaralist kasu. Küsimuseks on, kuidas seda arvesse võtta ja kas 
terve lapse sünnist saadav kasu tuleks VÕS § 127 lg 5 alusel maha arvata 
vanematele väljamõistmisele kuuluvast hüvitisest. 
Saksamaal saab kahjuhüvitisest arvata maha vaid samaliigilist kasu, st vara-
lise kahju hüvitisest varalist kasu ja mittevaralise kahju hüvitisest mittevaralist 
kasu. Ameerika Ühendriikide kohtupraktikas aga lähtutakse eelkõige sellest, 
millistel põhjustel on vanemad soovinud rasedust vältida.  
Autor on seisukohal, et mittevaralise kahju, mis seondub vastu tahtmist 
vanemaks olemise või pereplaneerimisse sekkumisega, mittehüvitamise õigusta-
miseks on kasu mahaarvamise argument üsna veenev. Võiks väita, et kahju, mis 
väljendub pereplaneerimisse sekkumises, sulandub selles rõõmus ja mittevara-
lises väärtuses, mida pakub lapse kasvatamine. Omaette küsimus on, kas see 
rõõm peaks suutma “sulatada” ka raseduse ja sünnitusega kaasnevat ebamuga-
vust ja füüsilist valu. Autori arvates mitte täiel määral, mistõttu lapse emal 
võiks olla õigus mõistlikus suuruses (et mitte öelda sümboolsele) hüvitisele 
füüsiliste kannatuste eest. 
Keerulisem on olukord varalise kahju “tasaarvestamisega”. Kui mõelda 
sellele, et millist varalist kasu võib soovimatu lapse sünd kaasa tuua, siis eel-
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kõige saab jutt olla sellest, et laps võib olla tulevikus kohustatud oma vanemaid 
ülal pidama (Perekonnaseaduse §-d 96-97). Kahjuhüvitise väljamõistmisel ei 
ole siiski ette teada, kas lapsel tekib tulevikus kohustus oma vanemaid ülal 
pidada. Seega on väga küsitav, kas sellist teoreetilist kasu saab kahjuhüvitise 
määramisel arvesse võtta.  
Kokkuvõtvalt on autor seisukohal, et ei ole sugugi lihtne leida argumente, 
mis õigustaks ülalpidamiskulude välja mõistmata jätmist saadavale kasule 
tuginedes. Mittevaraline väärtus, mida pakub lapse kasvatamine, võiks erandina 
tasakaalustada ülalpidamiskulud kui varalise kahju.  
Puudega lapse sünni korral on autori arvates väga kaheldav, kas sellise lapse 
sünni ja kasvatamisega seonduv rõõm on võrreldav terve lapse kasvatamise ja 
tema eest hoolitsemisega kaasneva rõõmuga. Autori arvates ei ole puudega 
lapse sünni korral alust VÕS § 127 lg 5 alusel kasu mahaarvamiseks vanematele 
väljamõistmisele kuuluvast hüvitisest. 
 
 
8. Kahjuhüvitise vähendamine vanemate enda osa tõttu kahju tekkimisel 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Soovimatu raseduse või puudega lapse sünni kaasustes ei ole põhjendatud 
kahjuhüvitise vähendamine põhjusel, et vanemad oleks saanud rasedust katkes-
tades või last lapsendamiseks ära andes kahju suurust vähendada või kahju 
üldse vältida.  
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Lapse ülalpidamiskulude hüvitamise üle otsustamisel võib sageli tõusetuda ka 
küsimus, kas vanemad ei ole neid kulusid endale ise põhjustanud (vähemalt 
osaliselt). Kannatanu osa kahju tekkimisel võimaldab arvesse võtta VÕS § 139 
lg 1.  
Kahjuhüvitise vähendamise küsimus soovimatu raseduse puhul saab tõuse-
tuda eelkõige juhtudel, kus naisel oli soovimatu raseduse avastamisel veel 
võimalus otsustada abordi kasuks, kuid ta ei teinud seda. Samamoodi võib 
kannatanu osa küsimuse tõstatada väitega, et vanematel oli võimalik ülal-
pidamiskohustuse tekkimist vältida, kui nad oleksid otsustanud anda lapse ära 
adopteerimiseks. 
Nii Saksamaal kui ka Ameerika Ühendriikides on kahjuhüvitise vähenda-
mine isiku enda osa tõttu kahju tekkimisel iseenesest võimalik, kuid sünnieelse 
kahju kaasustes ei anna ülalnimetatud väited nende riikide kohtutes alust 
kahjuhüvitise vähendamiseks.  
Käesoleva töö autori arvates ei ole õige jätta kahjuhüvitist sünnieelse kahju 
kaasustes välja mõistmata põhjendusega, et vanemad on need endale ise 
põhjustanud. Ilmselt oleks kahju tekitaja tuginemine sellele, et vanemad oleksid 
saanud kahju abordi tegemise või lapse adopteerimiseks äraandmise teel ära 
hoida, vastuolus hea usu põhimõttega (VÕS § 6). 
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9. Kahju hüvitamise ulatus soovimatu elu korral 
 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Juhul kui tervishoiuteenuse osutaja hüpoteetiliselt vastutaks lapse ees tema 
puudega sünni korral, tuleks lapsele hüvitada tema puudest tingitud lisakulud.  
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Ehkki autor leidis, et tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastutuse eeldused lapse ees 
tema puudega sünni korral ei ole täidetud, on autor analüüsinud, kas lapsele 
väidetavalt tekkinud kahju hüvitamine oleks VÕS-i alusel võimalik. 
Kuna Saksamaal nendes kaasustes eitatakse tervishoiuteenuse osutaja vastu-
tust lapse ees, siis ei ole Saksamaa kohtutes ka analüüsitud hüvitamisele 
kuuluvat kahju. Vähestes Ameerika Ühendriikide kohtutes, kus lapse nõue tema 
puudega sünni korral kuulub rahuldamisele, hüvitatakse üksnes lisakulutusi 
seoses ravi ja hooldusega, mis on vahetult seotud lapse puudega. Mittevaralist 
kahju Ameerika Ühendriikide kohtud lapsele nendes kaasustes ei hüvita. 
Autor on seisukohal, et VÕS § 130 lg 1 alusel oleksid lapse puudest tingitud 
lisakulud hüvitatavad ka Eestis. Erinevalt mittevaralisest kahjust on puudest 
tingitud lisakulud mõõdetavad ja need ei kao lapse täisealiseks saamisel, 
mistõttu tuleks kulude hüvitamist jätkata ka pärast lapse täisealiseks saamist. 
Juhul kui puudega lapse sünni korral on oma nõude esitanud samadel asjaoludel 
ka lapse vanemad, ei välista see iseenesest lapse enda nõude rahuldamist.  
Autori arvates ei ole puudega lapse sünni kaasustes lapse enda nõude puhul 
põhjust lapse enda kulusid vähendada VÕS § 127 lg 5 alusel. Puudega lapse elu 
kui puudega sündimisest saadud „kasu“ kujutab nendes kaasustes lapsele 
sisuliselt pealesunnitud kasu, mida ta tegelikult soovis vältida. 
 
10. Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju sünnieelsete kahjustuste kaasustes 
Autor on seisukohal, et arvestades eespool ülalpidamiskulude, kasu maha-
arvamise ja kannatanu enda osa arvestamise kohta märgitut, on VÕS-i järgi 
sünnieelsete kahjustuste kaasustes põhjendatud kokkuvõtvalt järgmise kahju 
hüvitamine. 
Soovimatu raseduse puhul tuleks varalise kahjuna hüvitada ravikulud ja 
sissetuleku kaotus, samuti kulutused uuele protseduurile, mis oli vajalik algse 
ebaõnnestunud protseduuri eesmärgi saavutamiseks. Autori arvates ei peaks 
olema hüvitatavad terve lapse ülalpidamiskulud. Mittevaraline väärtus, mida 
pakub lapse kasvatamine, võiks erandina tasakaalustada ülalpidamiskulud kui 
varalise kahju. 
Mittevaralise kahjuna tuleks lapse emale hüvitada mõistlik rahasumma 
raseduse ja sünnituse käigus kogetud füüsiliste ebamugavuste ja valu eest. Muu 
mittevaralise kahju (nt pereplaneerimisse sekkumine) peaks tasakaalustama 
rõõm lapse kasvatamisest. 
Puudega lapse sünni puhul tuleks varalise kahjuna hüvitada ravikulud ja 
sissetuleku vähenemine raseduse ajal ja tingituna vajadusest hoolitseda puudega 
lapse eest, samuti ebaõnnestunud protseduuri eesmärgi saavutamisele suunatud 
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uue protseduuri kulu. Lapse ülalpidamiskulud (s.o nii ootuspärased terve lapse 
ülalpidamiskulu kui ka lapse puudest tingitud lisakulu) võiksid samuti kuuluda 
hüvitamisele VÕS-i alusel. Lapse sünnist tuleneva võimaliku kasu on põhi-
mõtteliselt võimalik hüvitatavast kahjust maha arvata. 
Mittevaralise kahjuna on hüvitatav mittevaraline kahju seoses valu ja kanna-
tustega raseduse ja sünnituse ajal. Lisaks on hüvitatav mittevaraline kahju 
seoses pereplaneerimisse sekkumisega (eelkõige VÕS § 134 lg 1 alusel) ja 
mittevaraline kahju juhul, kui vanem(ad) on vahetuks tunnistajaks lapse kanna-
tustele ja järgnevale surmale. 
Juhul kui tervishoiuteenuse osutaja hüpoteetiliselt vastutaks lapse ees tema 
puudega sünni korral, tuleks lapsele hüvitada tema puudest tingitud lisakulud. 
Olgu märgitud, et Eesti kohtutel saab olema suhteliselt lai kaalutlusõigus 
hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju ja selle ulatuse määratlemisel. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
  
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Name:  Dina Sõritsa 
Date of Birth:  September 16, 1988 
E-mail:  dina.soritsa@kohus.ee 
 
Career 
2015 since judicial clerk, Tallinn Circuit Court 
2014–2015  judicial clerk, Tartu Circuit Court 
2008–2014  consultant, Tartu County Court, Tartu courthouse 
 
Education 
2012 to date University of Tartu, Faculty of Law, pursuing Ph.D.  
2010–2012 University of Tartu, Faculty of Law, M.A. 
2006–2010 University of Tartu, Faculty of Law, B.A. 
 
Publications: 
The Possibility of Compensation for Damages in Cases of Wrongful 
Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. An Estonian Perspective. 
European Journal of Health Law Vol. 21/2 (2014), pp 141–160. 
The Health-care Provider’s Civil Liability in the Cases of Wrongful Life. An 
Estonian Perspective. Juridica International Vol. 23 (2015), pp 43–51. 
  
148
Damages Subject to Compensation in Cases of Wrongful Birth: A Solution to 
Suit Estonia. Juridica International Vol. 24 (2016), pp 105–115.   
 
The Obligation of the Health-care Provider to Compensate for Damages in Case 
of Wrongful Conception: a Model to Suit Estonian Law. Journal of Medical 
Law and Ethics Vol. 4 Nr. 2 (2016) pp 95–111. 
ELULOOKIRJELDUS 
Nimi:  Dina Sõritsa 
Sünniaeg:  16. september, 1988 
E-mail:  dina.soritsa@kohus.ee 
 
Töökogemus 
2015 alates kohtujurist, Tallinna Ringkonnakohus 
2014–2015 kohtujurist, Tartu Ringkonnakohus 
2008–2014  konsultant, Tartu Maakohus, Tartu kohtumaja 
 
Hariduskäik 
2012 alates Tartu Ülikool, õigusteaduskond, doktoriõpe  
2010–2012 Tartu Ülikool, õigusteaduskond, magistriõpe 
2006–2010 Tartu Ülikool, õigusteaduskond, bakalaureuseõpe 
 
Publikatsioonid: 
The Possibility of Compensation for Damages in Cases of Wrongful 
Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. An Estonian Perspective. 
European Journal of Health Law Vol. 21/2 (2014), pp 141–160. 
The Health-care Provider’s Civil Liability in the Cases of Wrongful Life. An 
Estonian Perspective. Juridica International Vol. 23 (2015), pp 43–51. 
Damages Subject to Compensation in Cases of Wrongful Birth: A Solution to 
Suit Estonia. Juridica International Vol. 24 (2016), pp 105–115.   
 
 
149 
The Obligation of the Health-care Provider to Compensate for Damages in Case 
of Wrongful Conception: a Model to Suit Estonian Law. Journal of Medical 
Law and Ethics Vol. 4 Nr. 2 (2016) pp 95–111. 
DISSERTATIONES IURIDICAE  
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
 
1. Херберт Линдмяэ. Управление проведением судебных экспертиз и его 
эффективность в уголовном судопроизводстве. Тарту, 1991. 
2. Peep Pruks. Strafprozesse: Wissenschaftliche “Lügendetektion”. (Instru-
mentaldiagnostik der emotionalen Spannung und ihre Anwendungsmöglich-
keiten in Strafprozess). Tartu, 1991. 
3 Marju Luts. Juhuslik ja isamaaline: F. G. v. Bunge provintsiaalõigusteadus. 
Tartu, 2000. 
4. Gaabriel Tavits. Tööõiguse rakendusala määratlemine töötaja, tööandja ja 
töölepingu mõistete abil. Tartu, 2001. 
5. Merle Muda. Töötajate õiguste kaitse tööandja tegevuse ümberkorralda-
misel. Tartu, 2001. 
6. Margus Kingisepp. Kahjuhüvitis postmodernses deliktiõiguses. Tartu, 
2002. 
7. Vallo Olle. Kohaliku omavalitsuse teostamine vahetu demokraatia vormis: 
kohalik rahvaalgatus ja rahvahääletus. Tartu, 2002. 
8. Irene Kull. Hea usu põhimõte kaasaegses lepinguõiguses. Tartu, 2002. 
9. Jüri Saar. Õigusvastane käitumine alaealisena ja kriminaalsed karjäärid 
(Eesti 1985–1999 longituuduurimuse andmetel). Tartu, 2003. 
10. Julia Laffranque. Kohtuniku  eriarvamus. Selle  võimalikkus  ja  vajalikkus 
Eesti  Vabariigi  Riigikohtus  ja Euroopa  Kohtus. Tartu, 2003. 
11. Hannes Veinla. Ettevaatusprintsiip keskkonnaõiguses. Tartu, 2004. 
12. Kalev Saare. Eraõigusliku juriidilise isiku õigussubjektsuse piiritlemine. 
Tartu, 2004. 
13. Meris Sillaots. Kokkuleppemenetlus kriminaalmenetluses. Tartu, 2004.  
14. Mario Rosentau. Õiguse olemus: sotsiaalse käitumise funktsionaalne pro-
gramm. Tartu, 2004. 
15. Ants Nõmper. Open consent – a new form of informed consent for 
population genetic databases. Tartu, 2005. 
16. Janno Lahe. Süü deliktiõiguses. Tartu, 2005. 
17. Priit Pikamäe. Tahtluse struktuur. Tahtlus kui koosseisupäraste asjaolude 
teadmine. Tartu, 2006. 
18. Ivo Pilving. Haldusakti siduvus. Uurimus kehtiva haldusakti õiguslikust 
tähendusest rõhuasetusega avalik-õiguslikel lubadel. Tartu, 2006.  
19. Karin Sein. Ettenähtavus ja rikutud kohustuse eesmärk kui lepingulise 
kahjuhüvitise piiramise alused. Tartu, 2007.  
20. Mart Susi. Õigus tõhusale menetlusele enda kaitseks – Euroopa Inim-
õiguste ja Põhivabaduste Kaitse Konventsiooni artikkel 13 Euroopa Inim-
õiguste Kohtu dünaamilises käsitluses. Tartu, 2008. 
21. Carri Ginter. Application of principles of European Law in the supreme 
court of Estonia. Tartu, 2008. 
22. Villu Kõve. Varaliste tehingute süsteem Eestis. Tartu, 2009. 
150
23. Katri Paas. Implications of Smallness of an Economy on Merger Control. 
Tartu, 2009.  
24.  Anneli Alekand. Proportsionaalsuse printsiip põhiõiguste riive mõõdupuuna 
täitemenetluses. Tartu, 2009. 
25. Aleksei Kelli. Developments of the Estonian Intellectual Property System 
to Meet the Challenges of the Knowledge-based Economy. Tartu, 2009. 
26. Merike Ristikivi. Latin terms in the Estonian legal language: form, 
meaning and influences. Tartu, 2009. 
27. Mari Ann Simovart. Lepinguvabaduse piirid riigihankes: Euroopa Liidu 
hankeõiguse mõju Eesti eraõigusele. Tartu, 2010. 
28. Priidu Pärna. Korteriomanike ühisus: piiritlemine, õigusvõime, vastutus. 
Tartu, 2010. 
29. René Värk. Riikide enesekaitse ja kollektiivse julgeolekusüsteemi võima-
likkusest mitteriiklike terroristlike rühmituste kontekstis. Tartu, 2011. 
30.  Paavo Randma. Organisatsiooniline teovalitsemine – täideviija täideviija 
taga kontseptsioon teoorias ja selle rakendamine praktikas. Tartu, 2011. 
31. Urmas Volens. Usaldusvastutus kui iseseisev vastutussüsteem ja selle 
avaldumisvormid. Tartu, 2011. 
32. Margit Vutt. Aktsionäri derivatiivnõue kui õiguskaitsevahend ja ühingu-
juhtimise abinõu. Tartu, 2011. 
33. Hesi Siimets-Gross. Das „Liv-, Est- und Curlaendische Privatrecht” 
(1864/65) und das römische Recht im Baltikum. Tartu, 2011.  
34. Andres Vutt. Legal capital rules as a measure for creditor and shareholder 
protection. Tartu, 2011.  
35. Eneken Tikk. Comprehensive legal approach to cyber security. Tartu, 2011. 
36.  Silvia Kaugia. Õigusteadvuse olemus ja arengudeterminandid. Tartu, 2011. 
37.  Kadri Siibak. Pangandussüsteemi usaldusväärsuse tagamine ja teabe-
kohustuste määratlemine finantsteenuste lepingutes. Tartu, 2011. 
38. Signe Viimsalu. The meaning and functioning of secondary insolvency 
proceedings. Tartu, 2011.  
39. Ingrid Ulst. Balancing the rights of consumers and service providers in 
electronic retail lending in Estonia. Tartu, 2011.  
40. Priit Manavald. Maksejõuetusõigusliku regulatsiooni valikuvõimaluste 
majanduslik põhjendamine. Tartu, 2011, 193 lk. 
41. Anneli Soo. Remedies against ineffectiveness of defense counsel. Judicial 
supervision over the performance of defense counsel in Estonian criminal 
proceedings. Tartu, 2011, 282 p. 
42. Arnold Sinisalu. Mõjutustegevuse piirid rahvusvahelises õiguses. Tartu, 
2012, 277 lk. 
43. Kaspar Lind. Käibemaksupettused ja nende tõkestamine. Tartu, 2012,  
155 lk. 
44.  Berit Aaviksoo. Riigi otsustusruumi ahenemine: kodakondsus nüüdis-
aegses Euroopas. Tartu, 2013, 368 lk.  
45.  Kai Kullerkupp. Vallasomandi üleandmine. Õigusdogmaatiline raamistik 
ja kujundusvõimalused. Tartu, 2013, 398 lk. 
151 
46. Iko Nõmm. Käibekohustuse rikkumisel põhinev deliktiõiguslik vastutus. 
Tartu, 2013, 212 lk. 
47. Piia Kalamees. Hinna alandamine õiguskaitsevahendite süsteemis. Tartu, 
2013, 232 lk.  
48. Irina Nossova. Russia’s international legal claims in its adjacent seas: the 
realm of sea as extension of Sovereignty. Tartu, 2013, 205 p. 
49.  Age Värv. Kulutuste kondiktsioon: teise isiku esemele tehtud kulutuste 
hüvitamine alusetu rikastumise õiguses. Tartu, 2013, 273 lk. 
50.  Elise Vasamäe. Autoriõiguste ja autoriõigusega kaasnevate õiguste jätku-
suutlik kollektiivne teostamine. Tartu, 2014, 308 lk. 
51.  Marko Kairjak. Keerukuse redutseerimine Eesti õiguses karistusseadus-
tiku § 2172 objektiivse koosseisu relatiivsete õigusmõistete sisustamise 
näitel. Tartu, 2015, 179 lk.  
52.  Kadi Pärnits. Kollektiivlepingu roll ja regulatsioon nüüdisaegsetes töö-
suhetes. Tartu, 2015, 179 lk. 
53.  Leonid Tolstov. Tort liability of the director to company’s creditors. 
Tartu, 2015, 169 p. 
54.   Janar Jäätma. Ohutõrjeõigus politsei- ja korrakaitseõiguses: kooskõla 
põhiseadusega. Tartu, 2015, 242 lk. 
55.  Katre Luhamaa. Universal Human Rights in National Contexts: Appli-
cation of International Rights of the Child in Estonia, Finland and Russia. 
Tartu, 2015, 217 p.  
56.  Mait Laaring. Eesti korrakaitseõigus ohuennetusõigusena. Tartu, 2015, 
267 lk.  
57. Priit Kama. Valduse ja kohtuliku registri kande publitsiteet Eesti era-
õiguses. Tartu, 2016, 194 lk. 
58.  Kristel Degener. Abikaasade vara juurdekasvu tasaarvestuse varasuhe. 
Tartu, 2016, 242 lk. 
59.  Olavi-Jüri Luik. The application of principles of European insurance 
contract law to policyholders of the Baltic states: A measure for the 
protection of policyholders. Tartu, 2016, 228 p.  
60. Kaido Künnapas. Maksukohustuse täitmise preventiivne tagamine enne 
maksukohustuse tuvastamist: ettevaatuspõhimõte maksumenetluses.Tartu, 
2016, 388 lk.  
61. Eve Fink. Õiguspärase ootuse kaitse põhimõtte eeldused ja piirid Euroopa 
liidu õiguses. Tartu, 2016, 245 lk.  
62. Arsi Pavelts. Kahju hüvitamise nõue täitmise asemel ostja õiguste näitel. 
Tartu, 2017, 414 lk. 
63.  Anna-Maria Osula. Remote search and seizure of extraterritorial data. 
Tartu, 2017, 219 p. 
64. Alexander Lott. The Estonian straits. Exceptions to the strait regime of 
innocent or transit passage. Tartu, 2017, 259 p. 
 
